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Sovereign Debt, Private Wealth, and Market
Failure
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This Artice a/gues that the norms and legal practices of global finance in the
arenas of sovereign debt and private wealth have led to a signficant market failure in
particular the over-suppl of sovereign borrowing and a related misallocation o global
capital awayrom its most productive uses. It suggests that this deficieng rests on two
related elements: First, a searation of the risks and benefits of sovereign state control,
which has resulted rom a failure to properl and coherentl define the lines between
fpublic'and 'private' across the internationalfinancial renas of sovereign borrowing and
private client banking. And, second, the se!f-interested and potentiall internall
conflicted actions of major global banks. I use the lens of 'vulturefund' asset collection
efforts in sovereign debt to high/ight this problematic outcome, and also ask whether such
recovegy efforts offer a potential 'private' correction or the market failure. Ultimatey, I
argue that the vulture fund strategy is insufficient as a corrective, resting on internal
in consistencies and givig rise to its own pathologies. More significant structural reforms
and concetual reconfigurations are necessagy, which might capture the benefits of the
funds' efforts while minimijing their costs. The Article also tentatively raises deeer
theoretical and historical questions about how the /ines between public and private
wealth have arisen in globa/ inance and how the might be drawn goingforward.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Occasionally, the global financial pages offer up a particularly and
tellingly untoward public spectacle, as happened in 2006. Officials of the
Republic of Congo (sometimes referred to as Congo-Brazzaville) arrived at
the United Nations to plead the case for relief from the $9.2 billion
Congolese debt burden, little of which seemed to improve the country's
long-term development capacity but which, nonetheless, resulted in
overwhelming debt payments. The optics of this relief effort were
somewhat marred, however, by the decision of the presidential party to
rent forty-four rooms at the Waldorf Astoria over two weekends, spending
$400,000 in the process. This profligacy was layered on top of recent
revelations that presidential family members had purchased high-end real
estate and luxury goods in France-for example, C474,000 on clothes for
the fashionable first son. And this is over and above the private bank
accounts to which they had access, held in either their own names or those
of associates or shell companies.1 Perhaps unsurprisingly, the extravagant
display almost derailed the debt abatement program.2 Indeed, a French-led
coalition at the World Bank had to dissuade Bank President Paul
Wolfowitz from vetoing the relief, and he subsequently insisted that
stringent conditions attach to any debt cancellation due to corruption
concerns.
3
This sorry tale highlights how the global financial worlds of sovereign
debt and personal wealth may involve, and historically have involved, the
very same individuals, acting as agents for governments in sovereign debt
contracts but also as private clients for various financial and legal firms.
These two transactions may also implicate the very same funds-
borrowed in the name of a government but then appropriated by corrupt
individuals and invested as 'personal' wealth. As such, it points to an
important market failure in global finance: the oversupply of sovereign
borrowing and a related misallocation of global capital away from more
productive uses, too often toward the illicit enrichment of government
elites. While there has been significant scholarship in law, politics, and
1. Press Release, Glob. Witness, Republic of Congo: Is President's Son Paying for Designer
Shopping Sprees with Country's Oil Money? (June 26, 2007).
2. A cmcellation of the debt relief program may also have been lobbied for by so-called vulture
funds seeking to recover debt from the Congolese government, at least according to sources close to
the Congolese government. See Ari Berman, Rudy's Bird of Prey, NATION (Oct. 11, 2007),
https: //www.thenation.com/article /archive /rudys -bird-prey/.
3. For more on this episode, see, e.g., Robert Friedman, The Vulture Wars: A New York Hedge
Fund Is In a Court Battle Iith The Repubic of Congo Over IWho Is Robbing the Oiln-ch but Diupoor A'can
Nation, CNN MONEY (June 12, 2006),
https://money.cnn.com/2006/06/09/news/international/congo
fortune/; JASON SHARMAN, THE DESPOT'S GUIDE TO WEALTH MANAGEMENT: ON THE
INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST GRAND CORRUPTION 16-17 (2017).
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
economics on both sovereign debt issues and the problems associated with
endemic corruption, the deeper questions and conceptual entanglements
raised by the intersection of sovereign debt and ostensibly 'private' wealth
have not been fully considered.4 In particular, one key question has yet to
be properly addressed: what set of norms and legal practices have
supported this market failure, and what might be done to address it?
Broadly speaking, a market failure arises when the interaction of
private actors pursuing their interests in a market setting results in an
outcome that is detrimental to society as a whole.5 In this article, I argue
that the sovereign debt markets, which supply credit to sovereign state
borrowers, have over-supplied credit in ways that can misallocate capital,
exacerbate international financial crises, and impoverish borrower country
populations. I further suggest that this deficiency rests on two related
elements: First, a separation of the risks and benefits of sovereign state
control, which has resulted from a failure to properly and coherently
define the lines between 'public' and 'private' across the international
financial arenas of sovereign borrowing and private client banking. And,
second, the self-interested and potentially internally conflicted actions of
major global banks. I use the lens of 'vulture fund' asset collection efforts
in sovereign debt to highlight this problematic outcome, and also ask
whether such recovery efforts offer a potential private sector fix for the
market failure. Ultimately, I argue that the vulture fund strategy is
insufficient as a corrective, resting on internal inconsistencies and giving
rise to its own pathologies. More significant structural reforms and
conceptual reconfigurations are necessary, which might better capture the
benefits of the funds' efforts while minimizing their costs.
4. There has, of course, been handwringmg m popular commentary about he perfidy of
international institutions that historically pressed countries for debt payments and austerity measures
while turning a relatively blind eye to financial profligacy on the part of country elites. Indeed, in a
depressing epilogue to the 2006 Congo-Brazzaville anecdote, the country's debt by 2017 once more
reached nearly $9.2 billion under the same political family. And international financial institutions
again noted corruption and transparency as central issues in discussing the possibility of another debt
deal. Press Release, Int'l Monetary Fund, IMF Staff Concludes Program Negotiation Mission to the
Republic of Congo (Apr. 19, 2018),
https://www.inf/org/en/News/Artcles/2018/04/19/pr18137-inf-staff-concludes-program-
negotiation-mission-to-the-republic-of-congo. Although the IMF approved a bailout for the country
in July 2019, transparency advocacy group Global Witness expressed concern at the time that the
bailout would undermine the Fund's anti-corruption drive. Joe Bavier, IMF Approves Congo Republic
Bailout After China Debt Deal, REUTERS (July 11, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
congorepublic-imf/imf- approves -congo-republic-b ailout- after-china-debt- deal-idUSKCN 1 U 62NR.
5. I use the term market failure here in a broad sense and, for the purposes of this article, want
to sidestep both categorization of the varieties of market failure and general theoretical questions of
whether and when the costs of corrective public regulation might undermine its benefits. For the
classic original coining of the term, see Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q. J.
ECON. 351 (1958). For an interesting overview of the varieties of thinking on market failure across
the social, political, and intellectual context of the twentieth century, see Alain Marciano & Steven G.
Medema, Market Falure in Context: Introduction, 47 HIST. POL. ECON. (SUPPLEMENT) 1-19 (2015).
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At base, the global arena today offers an enticing combination to
debtor country elites: simultaneous access to an international pool of funds
borrowed on behalf of a public entity-for which the public entity is
ultimately responsible-and also to an international system highly
protective of private wealth, with relatively little concern for where that
wealth has come from. Particularly in times when public corruption
charges are either hard to prove or treated mildly, borrower state elites can
reap sizable financial benefits with relatively little risk of personal peril.
Borrower country populations of course suffer on both sides: They are
expected to pay down a debt burden that may well be augmented by
inflated borrowing, while some portion of public wealth has been
surreptitiously sequestered and then categorized as 'personal' through the
privacy norms of global financial institutions. While this dynamic is hardly
present in every country-and the magnitude of the impact would be
difficult to measure-where it does exist it likely feeds into the broader
tendencies of international financial crises: It would first deepen the over-
leveraging of sovereign states and then exacerbate austerity measures by
enabling the disappearance of public funds. The self-interested actions of
debtor state elites and their creditors and bankers thus result in deeply
problematic outcomes for the international community as a whole and
particularly for some of its most vulnerable populations.
In Part II, I suggest that this state of events rests on two related
elements. First, I discuss how modern global norms and legal practices-
and in particular their incomplete and inconsistent definitions of the
'public' and the 'private' in the arenas of sovereign debt and private wealth
management-have resulted in a separation of the risks and benefits of
controlling a sovereign state. Contemporary practices of transnational
lending to sovereigns have not involved asking whether state borrowing
actually benefits (and is authorized by) the public entity itself as opposed
to private individuals associated with the state. And debt repayment norms
have similarly supported an expectation that all debt should be repaid as
the obligation of the public entity, regardless of any private siphoning of
funds. For transnational flows associated with private wealth, however, the
dividing lines between the private and public have been strongly
demarcated: any effort to investigate or access personal client funds on
behalf of a public must overcome very high and sometimes
insurmountable hurdles established to cordon off and protect the private
arena. Certain government elites seem to have taken ample advantage of
this disconnect, borrowing freely on behalf of an ill-defined 'sovereign
state' and then drawing off some portion of those funds into the tightly
circumscribed realm of private wealth management.
Part II also details how this market failure in contemporary global
finance may well have been deepened by a second, more material factor:
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the self-interested and potentially internally conflicted actions of major
global banks. One way in which the practices and inconsistencies at the
center of this market failure could be exposed and mitigated is through the
practice of debt collection and asset recovery: When sovereign debtors fail
to repay, how do creditors try to collect? And, particularly for the
questions of this paper, to what degree do they try to collect against the
ostensibly private assets of sovereign officials? Such a targeting of allegedly
'private' funds-by claiming that they are actually sovereign funds-would
inject greater risk into sovereign borrowing and public corruption for
government officials. This risk could help to temper the excesses of both
practices: those accessing credit, supposedly on behalf of the sovereign
state, could find themselves targeted if the debt proves unsustainable and
if they have partaken in blurring the lines between public and private
wealth. So why have sovereign debt collection efforts targeting private
wealth-a strategy eventually taken up by 'vulture funds' toward the turn
of the twenty-first century-not been more widespread in modern
finance?
Although I do not make anything close to a complete causal assertion,
I raise the possibility that internal conflicts of interest in key segments of
the international banking establishment might be a factor. From the close
of World War II through the end of the Cold War, banks, rather than
individual investors or funds, played the central role in the private
financing of sovereign states. And many of these banks had (and still have)
not only sovereign lending interests but also personal banking or private
wealth departments, whose clients could well include highly connected
individuals within sovereign borrower states. As such, these institutions
might have benefited sufficiently from both their sovereign lending and
their private wealth departments to avoid jeopardizing the practices and
individual relationships that sustained either revenue stream. In particular,
it is possible that if such bank creditors had aggressively sought to recover
against the privately held assets of borrowing country officials, the trail
may have led awkwardly back to their own doorstep. This would have
threatened not only private banking revenue, by exposing these banks as
untrustworthy and insufficiently discreet from the perspective of their
wealth management clients (potentially even beyond a corrupt government
official clientele). In addition, such a strategy would likely have
undermined their sovereign lending business as well, given that any
corrupt government officials among their private banking clients would
almost certainly have been gatekeepers to the even more lucrative
sovereign debt revenue stream.
In Part III, I use the lens of asset collection efforts in sovereign debt
to shed more light on this problematic intersection between sovereign debt
and private wealth and also ask whether such recovery efforts could offer a
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potential 'private' correction for the market failure. In particular, I focus
on a specific approach adopted in several cases by so-called 'vulture
funds' investors that purchase distressed debt on the secondary market
and then hold out or litigate for a preferential outcome compared to other
creditors. The collection sub-strategy at issue here effectively alleges that
the lines between 'sovereign' and 'private' wealth have not been respected
by the country's officials, that certain sovereign assets have been
improperly siphoned into personal accounts or shell entities controlled by
those officials or their close associates, and that therefore these ostensibly
private assets should be understood as public money and, consequently,
collectible by creditors of the sovereign state. This strategy, adopted
against Congo-Brazzaville and Argentina and thus far relatively little
discussed, very explicitly targets the intersection between sovereign debt
and private wealth and thus simultaneously exploits and exposes these
underlying entanglements in international finance. It also provides a public
benefit by shedding light on the mechanisms by which corruption can
work at the highest levels and thus arguably offers a private corrective to
the market failure by re-merging the benefit and the risk of controlling
public sovereign assets as if they were personal wealth.
Finally, in Part IV, I ask whether the possible benefits of this vulture
fund sub-strategy are great enough to outweigh the problems these funds
pose for the international financial architecture. I argue that ultimately the
vulture fund strategy is insufficient and unsustainable as a corrective,
giving rise to its own pathologies, resting on internal inconsistencies, and
depending on a flawed global restructuring framework. I also raise
preliminary questions about whether other approaches could capture some
of the positives with fewer negatives: Might a future sovereign bankruptcy
framework include provisions to uncover and then recover improperly
transferred funds on a more collective and socially beneficial basis? What
political considerations should shape any such discussion? Are there
alternative private approaches, more closely tracking the vulture fund
strategy, that could be thought through in a non-bankruptcy setting? Could
the problematic norms and practices of sovereign debt and private wealth
be more directly addressed up front? Ultimately, any reform efforts at the
intersection of these two areas of international finance will need to be
taken with an understanding of the political complexities and historical
embeddedness of their related practices. And, I suggest, seriously thinking
through these issues invites deeper theoretical and historical questions into
how the lines between public and private wealth have arisen in global
finance and how they might be drawn going forward.
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II. UN-LINKING THE RISKS AND REWARDS OF 'SOVEREIGN'
BORROWING
It may seem commonplace today that a sovereign state's wealth, and a
creditor's claim to it, remains separate from the personal wealth of an
individual ruler or head of state. Of course, this has not always been the
case. At the dawn of the Hundred Years' War, King Edward III of
England arrived in Flanders with insufficient funds to support his military
ambitions. He turned to private creditors on the continent for financing,
and as a special inducement offered as collateral all of his jewels, those of
his wife, their golden chalice and lesser crowns, his war horse, and even his
grandfather Edward I's Great Crown.6 Dissatisfied with his inability to
pay, the creditors seized the Great Crown in 1339, along with several of
his family members who had personally guaranteed the loans. One cousin,
the Earl of Derby, was held hostage for several months, and the Great
Crown itself was not returned until 1345.7 While hardly widespread, this
pattern of a ruler pledging his or her personalty for sovereign borrowing
seems to have been an accepted practice-Charles IV and Maximilian I of
the Holy Roman Empire also secured loans with a crown, coronation
robe, and personal jewels.8
Of course, such a practice is not entirely surprising in eras of
personalistic rule in which 'the sovereign' is at once a state and an earthly
individual, with the mechanisms and benefits of control and final personal
responsibility all ultimately resting with a single person or family.9 Even
without a pledge of collateral, creditors would presumably have felt
entitled to seize even the most personal of personalty from a ruler's family,
if not for the nuisance of castle walls and defending armies. But what these
episodes underscore is that the benefits and the risks of unfettered
sovereign rule were joined together: An individual or family might enrich
itself by virtue of sovereign control of a given territory, through taxation
or through loans implicitly or explicitly backed by the treasure of the land.
But the personal benefits and individually enjoyed luxuries resulting from
that control were also at risk if things went awry. What the Congo-
Brazzaville anecdote and others like it highlight are the ways in which
these two things have been disconnected, at least in recent memory. Those
6. E. B. Fryde, Financial Resources of Edward III in the Netherlands, 1337-40 (2nd Part, 45 REVUE
BELGE DE PHILOLOGIE ET D'HISTOIRE 1142, 1144, 1154-55, 1158, 1165-66, 1176 (1967). See also
Michael H. Hoeflich, Through a Glass Darkl: Reflections Upon the Histog of the International Law of Public
Debt in Connection with State Succession, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 39, 40 (1982).
7. Fryde, supranote 6, at 1155, 1166.
8. Hoeflich, supra note 6, at 40.
9. For the classic presentation of this feature of sovereignty, see ERNST IKANTOROWICZ, THE
KING'S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1957). One could also say
that the governmental principal-agent problem does not exist when the sovereign individual and the
state is one and the same.
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in control of sovereign states have in some cases managed to personally
enjoy a level of luxury and power that would be unavailable to them absent
the backing (or plundering) of a sovereign territory's treasure, while fully
expecting that their personal lifestyles and access to funds should not be
interrupted should things go wrong for the state itself 10
In this section, I argue that the rules and practices of global finance
have enabled this unlinking of the benefits and the risks of sovereign
borrowing and are thus at least partially responsible for the market failure
that follows from this disconnect. I first briefly highlight how, from the
perspective of ruling officials, the governing norms of sovereign debt have
for a long time granted access to a significant pool of funds with very few
questions asked. I then point out how the rules and practices of the private
wealth arena may enable the disappearance of such funds into personal or
individually controlled accounts. Finally, I emphasize that ruling officials
are not the only actors to have benefited from such an arrangement.
Certain members of the international banking establishment may also
benefit on both sides of this equation-a dual benefit, or perhaps conflict
of interest, that could dampen their appetite for potentially embarrassing
asset recovery efforts. Overall, the norms of global finance are such that
both ruling officials and financial institutions can profit on both sides, to
the detriment of country borrower populations.
A. Sovereign Debt and the Failure to Inquire
In 2012, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) published a non-binding set of Principles on Promoting
Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing. In the section on
'Responsibilities of Lenders,' the Principles state:
Lenders should recognize that government officials involved in
sovereign lending and borrowing transactions are responsible for
protecting public interest (to the State and its citizens for which
they are acting as agents)... Lenders to sovereign borrowers are
dealing with agents . . . Any attempt by a lender to suborn a
government official to breach that duty is wrongful.1
10. To clarify, I focus here on situations in which rulers or heads of state enrich themselves
beyond their receipt of official stipends or incomes. Queen Elizabeth II, of the United Kingdom,
certainly receives a grand stipend and lives in luxury, but she has relatively little power and the
procedures and sums involved all appear to be above board. If she were to enrich herself beyond
these mechanisms, that would of course come closer to the problematic situations at the center of my
concern.
11. U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Pnnczples on Promoting Responsible Soverelgn
Lenhng andBorrowing, art. 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/GDS/DDF/2012/Misc. 1 (Jan. 10, 2012).
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This statement echoed efforts by scholars and debt cancellation activists,
starting roughly a decade earlier, to introduce or revive a doctrine of
odious debt, by which a fallen regime's debts would not continue to its
successor if those debts either were not authorized by or did not benefit
the underlying population.1 2 Both the UNCTAD Principles and the odious
debt doctrine espouse the idea that sovereign lending should have a more
substantial connection to the borrowing country's people, who will
ultimately bear the brunt of either repayment or restructuring.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, these ideas have yet to gain very wide
acceptance in practice, particularly in international investor and creditor
circles. The longstanding norm has been to lend quite freely, without
concern for the possible distinctions and relations of responsibility
between public sovereign entities and the private individuals that control
and staff them. And even when fiduciary-type ideas of loyalty are widely
viewed to have been violated-for example, in the case of apartheid South
Africa-sovereign borrowers have themselves been wary to act, concerned
about the potential effect of a cancellation effort on their reputation and
future capacity to access international capital markets. This is not at all to
say that either the norms surrounding continuous sovereign debt
repayment or their reputational underpinnings are uniform or inevitable-
I have argued elsewhere that both repayment practices and
creditworthiness assessments themselves are more theoretically unstable
and historically variable than we often assume.13 But the historically
common practice has been to lend to countries with very little constraint:
Creditors have considered themselves relatively free from any due
diligence requirement beyond an assessment of the stability and income-
generating capacity of the country in question. This approach dominates
expectations of debt repayment as well, where creditors have insisted on
repayment even when the circumstances of a loan or the character of the
borrowing regime might be considered problematic.
Such a characterization of sovereign debt norms should not be
surprising to those familiar with the history of sovereign lending. In the
words of one banker working in the 1970s, during which private lending to
sovereigns picked up in earnest after a mid-century slump, 'When I first
12. See, eg., Seema Jayachamdrma & Michael Kremer, Odous Debt, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 82, 82
(2006); Lee Buchheit, Mini Gulati, & Robert B. Thompson, The Dilemma of OQhous Debts, 56 DUKE
L.J. 1201 (2007). These scholars were reviving a 1927 formulation of the doctrine by Alexamder N.
Sack, LES EFFETS DES TRANSFORMATIONS DES ETATS SUR LEURS DETTES PUBLIQUES ET AUTRES
OBLIGATIONS FINANCIERES [THE IMPACT OF STATE TRANSFORMATIONS ON THEIR PUBLIC
DEBTS AND OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS] 157 (1927).
13. See generaly ODETTE LIENAU, RETHINKING SOVEREIGN DEBT: POLITICS, REPUTATION,
AND LEGITIMACY IN MODERN FINANCE (2014) (arguing that the conventional wisdom expecting
repayment of all debt even across major regime chamges is overly simplistic, and that this norm and
its associated creditworthiness assessments have been shaped over the last century by changing
market structures and broader ideological shifts).
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started I was amazed at how casual it all seemed. When I first signed a loan
agreement for twenty million dollars for a country I hardly knew anything
about, I thought 'we must be crazy."' 14 Even when lenders did have
greater knowledge of the internal rules and possible legal limitations on a
sovereign borrower, they did not seem to consider this a serious
impediment. For example, a 1970s syndicate involving banks from the
U.S., Switzerland, Canada, and the UK, organized by Chase Manhattan,
wished to make a $500 million loan to the imperial Iranian government.
The complication was that the Iranian constitution technically required
parliamentary approval for a debt contract of this type-an issue that was
(courageously) raised by the syndicate's Iranian legal advisor.
Notwithstanding this requirement, the Shah's Ministry of Justice, along
with the syndicate's non-Iranian counsel, assured the syndicate that the
constitutional provision was not an issue, and the loan went forward on
this basis.15 This irregularity might, or perhaps should, have raised red flags
and led to further inquiry on how the Shah's appointed executive branch
officials related to the underlying constitution-the document ostensibly
constitutive of Iran as a public entity in the first place. But it seems no
such inquiry was considered necessary. In a similar vein, Citibank made a
loan to the government that was arranged through the Shah's twin sister;
the funds ultimately went to build a palace rather than the originally, if
vaguely, stated housing project.16
This failure to inquire as to the properly public content of sovereign
borrowing continued past one-off private creditors and into the practices
of collective restructuring as well. The banks making up the informal
'London Club' of private creditors to sovereign states, assembled through
ad hoc committees and working groups to address sovereign borrower
payment difficulties, did not consider possible lending irregularities
relevant to their restructuring processes.17 Even if any particular bank
might have softened, the collective dynamics of the group, which I discuss
in section II.C below, meant that ultimately debtor states faced a fairly
unyielding united front.18 And the 'Paris Club' of major bilateral official
lenders, which meets when needed to address the payment problems of
14. As quoted in ANTHONY SAMPSON, THE MONEY LENDERS: BANKERS AND A WORLD IN
TURMOIL 115 (1982).
15. Bill Paul, Caveat Lender Chase Bank and Others Face Court Challenges on Huge Loans to Iran,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 1980, at 1, 31; Jeff Gerth, Chase's Lawsuit Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
1980, at Dl, D13 (describing Chase's claim of an Iranian default on this loan).
16. SAMPSON, supra note 14, at 236.
17. See LIENAU, supra note 13, at 166-171. On the London Club generally, see, e.g., ALEXIS
RIEFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE FOR AD Hoc MACHINERY 95-131
(2003).
18. For more on how the dynamics of restructuring limited the range of possible arguments
open to sovereign states, particularly during the London Club heyday of the 1980s, see, e.g., LIENAU,
supranote 13, at 184-190.
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debtor countries, has similarly declined to address such irregularities, at
least explicitly, even as it worked on efforts to restructure or cancel debt
on the basis of financial hardship. This Paris Club approach is perhaps
unsurprising, given that corrupt and oppressive debtor regimes have, in
some cases, been actively supported by bilateral creditors as part of
broader geopolitical strategies.19 While sovereign lending practices have
developed beyond this point, recent scandals in states such as Malaysia,
Venezuela, and Mozambique-emphasize that the few-questions-asked
policies remain widespread.20 One clear result is a larger, faster, and less
discriminating flow of funds into sovereign states than might otherwise
exist.
B. The Construction and Protection of Personal' Wealth
If those in charge of sovereign states have historically had access to
large sums of money while facing very little in the way of external
questions or controls, any sums they then claimed as their own were
subject to similarly little scrutiny. And, unsurprisingly given the pecuniary
interests involved, the financial houses focused on wealth management
have taken the utmost care to protect the boundaries of the private and
personal.21 Historically, the fact that a private banking client might have
held high public office or had significant access to public money in some
other way was not considered relevant. Once funds had been deposited,
the rules and norms of this regime effectively reified the designation of
such property as 'personal,' helping to mitigate the risk of borrowing
against and then siphoning away sovereign wealth.
19. Anna Gelpem has suggested that the resulting debt should, perhaps, not be characterized as
a true loan in the first place. Anna Gelpem, Oh'ous, Not Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81, 83
(2007).
20. For a sampling of the media coverage of these crises, see, e.g., Shamim Adam, The 'MDB
Deals that Continue to Haunt Goldman Sachs, BLOOMBERG, (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.bloomberg
.com/news /articles /2018-11-02/ the- lmdb-deals-that-continue-to-haunt-goldman-sachs-quicktake;
Ben Bartenstein, Goldman Says It's Learnedjrom Venezuelas 'Hunger Bonds' Backlash, BLOOMBERG, (Apr.
15, 2018), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/artcles/2018-03-15/goldman-says-it-s-leamed-from-
venezuela-hunger-bonds-backlash; Paul Wallace, U.S. Probe and Creaht Suisse Lawsuit Roil Mozambique
Tuna Bonds, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.
bloomberg.com/news /articles/2019-03-06/u-s-probe- and-credit- suisse-lawsuit-roil-mozambique-
tuna-bonds.
21. Of course, I am speaking here of financial matters. In making the public-private distinction
I do not mean to engage directly (though perhaps there is still an indirect connection) with the
characterization of the private as the sphere of the body or the domestic, as distinct from a more
communal, communicative, and cerebral public (i.e., Arendt or Habermas). Instead, I intend 'private'
here to connote more specifically the sphere of an individual's (and perhaps his or her family's) own
personal use and enjoyment, including the exclusion of others from that sphere. In this I use the term
in a way that mimics more closely the colloquial understanding of private property, with its
suggestion of exclusive use and protection from exogenous claims or even from external view and
judgment.
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Central to this policing of the private has been the provision of
banking secrecy, which recently has softened somewhat but remains
powerful. Although over the last century or so this norm has perhaps been
most associated with Switzerland, the expectation of bank secrecy is
widespread. And there is some evidence to suggest that the practice goes
back to the earliest banking rules, written into Roman law, the German law
of the Visigoths, and the early statutes of medieval northern Italy.2 2 Still,
the Swiss enforcement of this norm is understood to have been the most
stringent, and in 1934 Switzerland incorporated into law the imposition of
criminal penalties for releasing private bank information or the identities
of private clients.2 3 This set the standard for bank secrecy more generally,
and jurisdictions that wished to compete could not stray too far from this
practice. The 'offshore' jurisdictions of the British Virgin Islands, the
Cayman Islands, Guernsey, and Panama, for example, emulated the
commitment to protecting private information when they established their
financial centers in later years.2
4
Of course, the fact that this information was not historically
available to either the general public or foreign governments (or indeed
Swiss authorities, for that matter) does not mean that the financial
institutions themselves were necessarily unaware of the provenance of
funds, at least in some circumstances. And it seems that certain more
established private institutions and large commercial banks declined to
accept deposits from individuals they viewed as unsavory, even if those
institutions considered themselves legally entitled to do so and even if they
did not begrudge the acceptance of such funds by other banks.2 5 In his
1966 description of Swiss banks, historian and commentator T.R.
Fehrenbach argued that, "No Swiss bank will knowingly accept stolen
money." That said, the definition of 'stolen' was carefully circumscribed.
He went on to note that the funds brought to Switzerland by tyrannical
public actors:
... cannot legally be described as stolen money. In the days when
they secured it, Colonel Per6n, President Batista and Premier
22. T.R. FEHRENBACH, THE GNOMES OF ZURICH: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE Swiss BANKS
74 (1966). Among the latter, Fehrenbach ighlights the Bank of Saint Ambrosius of Milan, "which
stipulated severe punishment for anyone in the bank who revealed information about clients without
the client's permission." Id.
23. Id at 75-76; BRADLEY BIRKENFELD, LUCIFER'S BANKER: THE UNTOLD STORY OF HOW I
DESTROYED Swiss BANK SECRECY 17-24 (2016) (providing an accessible overview of the history of
Swiss banking secrecy).
24. The provision of privacy, in order to shield against the likelihood of government regulation
and taxation and the risk of creditor claims, has become central to the practice of offshore wealth
management. See, eg., BROOKE HARRINGTON, CAPITAL WITHOUT BORDERS: WEALTH MANAGERS
AND THE ONE PERCENT 128- 35 (2016).
25. FEHRENBACH, supra note 22, at 126-28.
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Tshombe were the law in their respective countries. The fact that
most dictators . . . used shotguns, armed thugs, military force and
nauseating tortures on many of their subjects to raise it, does not
change the fact. In point of law, [such] money is as 'legal' as the
royal allowance paid by the Socialist government of Great Britain
to Elizabeth 11.26
Fehrenbach here of course uses 'the law' broadly and colloquially, given
that-as highlighted by the Iran anecdote above-the actually written (if
ignored) rules of these autocrats' countries may have prohibited their
specific methods of rulership and also their borrowing and siphoning of
funds. Nonetheless, it is certainly the case that these heads of state could
have been perceived as 'the state' enough that banks felt absolved of any
further need for due diligence or attention to black letter rules.
27
At least one American court seems to have offered preliminary
support for this view based on its own encounter with the Iranian case.
Following the revolution and overthrow of the Shah in 1979, the new
regime brought suit against the Shah and his family in New York state
court, attempting to recover wealth that it alleged had been stolen from
the Iranian people. The regime overall sought $56.6 billion in damages,
claiming that the Shah's family had diverted at least $20 billion from the
government through private foundations, in particular the Pahlavi
Foundation of Teheran. The suits further argued that the Shah and his
family members had a "fiduciary obligation" to citizens of Iran and thus
should "refrain from profiting personally" at the expense of the
populace-prefiguring the language of the 2012 UNCTAD Principles
mentioned above.2 8 The suit was dismissed at the request of the Shah's
estate and his widow, with the court expressing the view that New York
was not an appropriate forum for the litigation, which would place an
"unnecessary heavy burden" on New York courts.29 The New York
Supreme Court's Appellate Division upheld the dismissal, focusing largely
on the great expense and administrative burden on the court system.30
However, it also expressed doubt as to whether American courts could
determine "whether an absolute monarch of a foreign country can be held
responsible for personally profiting from the use of his powers as an
26. Id. at 127.
27. In this, the banks may have been subscribing to what I have called elsewhere a 'statist'
theory of sovereignty, in which an entity is considered sovereign simply by virtue of its physical
control of a state's territory and population, regardless of the internal political features of its
governance. LIENAU, sopra note 13, at 4-6, 36-38.
28. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 455 N.Y.S.2d 987, 990 (Sup. Ct. 1982). See also, e.g.,
discussion in Charles Kaiser, Iran SuesShah and Wifeor 56 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1979, atA16.
29. Khomeini's Suit Against the Shah Dismissed, UPI, (Sept. 14, 1981), https://www.upi.com/Arch
ives /1981/ 09/ 14/ Khomeinis-suit- against- the-shah-dismissed/ 9321369288000/.
30. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 94 A.D.2d 374, 375 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
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absolute monarch."31 The court further noted that "there can have been
very few absolute monarchs in the history of the world who did not profit
personally from their powers" and even explicitly acknowledged that
"these rulers and their families are said to have large investments and bank
deposits in this country."32 Ultimately, the court preferred to stay out of
the "political thicket." In doing so, it effectively gave a nod to the norms
adopted by banks in their protection of arguably private wealth. It also
thus inadvertently supported the unlinking of the risks and benefits of
absolute sovereign control, allowing the Shah's family and other similarly
placed twentieth century ruling elites a luxury not actually enjoyed by the
absolute monarchs of old, as indicated by the 14th century tale of Edward
III of England and his creditors.
In addition to the rules and norms of bank secrecy, certain
mechanisms of transmitting funds would have aided, and potentially
continue to aid, efforts to protect such wealth. Although wire transfers
constitute perhaps the simplest method to move capital, other (sometimes
colorful) methods of moving funds and other valuables were used with
little question. Notes one wealth manager, speaking especially of offshore
banking centers, they "were very much like [author John] Grisham's The
Firm-people showed up with suitcases of cash to the Cayman Islands,
and nobody asked any questions."33 Indeed, suitcases of cash and other
valuables feature prominently in these anecdotes, along with the occasional
plane full of cash: Speaking of the British Virgin Islands, now in the early
1990s, "there was a lot of cash being flown in on private planes, and the
biggest complaint of the [BVI] banks was that they had too few cash-
counting machines and they broke down from overuse."34 Perhaps not
coincidentally, suitcases of cash feature in some details of high-level
bribery as well, as in the World Duty Free v. Kena arbitration, in which then-
Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi seems to have received a suitcase full of
cash as part of the negotiations for a concession agreement involving the
establishment of duty-free stores at Kenya's major airports.35 This is not to
say that all of the suitcases of cash deposited in these banking centers were
31. Id. at 375. This appeals court decision arguably cast doubt on a 1982 decision by another
judge who ruled that Iran could bring a suit against the Shah's sister. See E.R Shipp, Appeals Judges
Back Dismissal of Suit on Shah, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1983, at 23. And, as noted in Part II.A above, it is
worth pointing out that certain of the Iranian loans were signed in contravention of the Iranian
constitution, raising further questions about the relationship of absolute monarchy and the rule of
law. For more on the political and economic background of the Iran case, see LIENAU, supra note 13,
at 179-184.
32. Islamic Republic of Iran, 94 A.D.2d at 376.
33. HARRINGTON, supra note 24, at 138-139 (quoting a Canadian wealth manager working in
London).
34. Id. at 139 (quoting an English manager based in Hong Kong who worked in the British
Virgin Islands in the early 1990s).
35. World Duty Free Co. Ltd. v. Republic of Kenya, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/07, Award (Oct.
4, 2006).
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the proceeds of corruption or other problematic activities. However, it
would certainly seem a simple method of converting public funds into
ostensibly private wealth, with few questions asked and perhaps little
documentary evidence left to risk discovery.
Of course, several steps have been made regionally and globally to
address corruption at the highest, kleptocratic levels, including through a
regime of asset recovery that throws into question the historic norms of
private banking. Key efforts here include the UN Convention Against
Corruption (UNCAC), the related World Bank Stolen Asset Recovery
Initiative (STAR), the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, a number of state-
level laws and initiatives including bank transparency laws, unexplained
wealth laws, broker-dealer regulations, and programs such as the U.S.
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN).36 These shifts have led
to several important victories and have certainly helped to alter the
discourse in most polite society.
But the scale of funds recovered by governments through these
frameworks has been disappointingly low compared to estimates of the
funds siphoned away. Particularly given the liquidity and international
convertibility of capital and the multiple jurisdictions emerging as global
financial hubs, including for example Hong Kong and Singapore, this is
likely to remain the case going forward. Even the major 'onshore' centers,
which have been at the forefront of the shift, struggle with internal
problems. For example, beginning in 1977, Swiss banks have technically
been legally obligated to identify their customers.37 And, beginning in the
1990s, Switzerland and other major Western countries have made efforts
to improve the laws governing funds potentially linked to corruption. Still,
the family and associates of Sani Abacha, who ruled Nigeria between 1993-
1998, managed to store considerable wealth in Switzerland and the UK in
particular. For example, Credit Agricole opened accounts worth $147
million for relatives of Sani Abacha, determining their identity and
relationship to Abacha but not inquiring into the source of funds. And
Credit Suisse allowed Abacha's sons to deposit over $200 million without
properly identifying them.38
These banks were hardly alone, and the problem has persisted well
beyond the 1990s. Based on a survey of 27 banks, the UK's Financial
Services Authority issued a 2011 report on the compliance of British banks
with respect to regulations designed to limit money-laundering, and the
36. For a practitioner-oriented background document prepared by the World Bamk Stolen Asset
Recovery Initiative, see JEAN-PIERRE BRUN ET AL., ASSET RECOVERY HANDBOOK: A GUIDE FOR
PRACTITIONERS (2011).
37. SHARMAN, supra note 3, at 96.
38. Id. Sometimes the method of looting can be fairly obvious with a small amount of research.
For example, Abacha's coterie seems to have diverted truckloads of cash belonging to the central
bank, eventually sending the funds to foreign bank accounts. See also id at 97.
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picture was disappointing. Despite their responsibilities under the
regulations, fewer than half the banks scrutinized high-risk clients with any
extra care. And fewer than a quarter of the banks actually bothered to
properly verify the source of client wealth-the space on the relevant
forms for source-of-wealth information was frequently filled in "not
known" or left blank altogether3 9 The report concluded that "it is likely
that some banks are handling the proceeds of corruption or other financial
crime."40 Although British banks can be fined for such activity, the UK
regulatory authorities have tended not to impose especially serious
financial penalties. For example, Coutts Bank was fined [8.75 million in
2012 for "significant, widespread and unacceptable" failures in its
compliance procedures, particularly with regard to determining the source
of funds from private clients from the Middle East and eastern Europe.
41
The continuation of these problems has been exacerbated by the fact
that, especially in recent years, significant funds move not through
personal bank accounts per se but rather through legal entities such as
corporations, trusts, and foundations. These ntities provide another layer
of discretion, rendering it yet more difficult to make any link between the
individuals that may benefit from these entities and their potentially public
official duties or source of funds. And the secret, numbered Swiss bank
account of days past-while still alive and well today-has been joined by
significant investment in real property and other assets as a store for
wealth. Brooke Harrington, in her study of global wealth managers, notes
that "the new norm is to hold a wide variety of assets-many of them
globally mobile and fungible-in multiple jurisdictions in a complex of
financial-legal structures."42
The degree to which these legal fictions are understood, certainly by
the actors involved, to be merely games with names is hardly surprising
but remains worthy of emphasis. Harrington relates an anecdote shared by
an American wealth manager based in Geneva who works frequently with
clients from the Arabian Peninsula: He mentioned a situation in which one
client had displayed too transparently the degree to which he considered
the corporate legal structure "a personal bank account" by another name.
To wit, the client:
... asked me to send him $100,000 from company funds so that
he could buy a Ferrari. I had to say no, and he said, What do you
39. U.K. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., BANKS' MANAGEMENT OF HIGH MONEY-LAUNDERING RISK
SITUATIONS 6, 27 (2011), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/corporate/fsa-aml-final-report.pdf.
40. Id at 6.
41. Political scientist Jason Sharman notes the modest size of the fine and points out that, "In
the absence of any substantial financial penalties, and given the squeamishness over naming and
shaming, it is very difficult to see why British banks' performance would have improved since 2011."
SHARMAN, supra note 3, at 138.
42. HARRINGTON, supra note 24, at 124.
VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
mean, no?' I said, 'This is a company and you're a shareholder, so
perhaps you're requesting a distribution? I had to coach him on
the right words to use, and said, 'Would you please delete those
emails you sent me requesting the cash for the Ferrari?'
43
A distribution or dividend from a corporation-particularly a shell
corporation with no actual ongoing commercial functionality-seems
fairly transparently to be a cash withdrawal. But the attention to legal form,
along with a set of background and increasingly globalized norms that
continue to favor privacy, regardless of potentially countervailing laws on
the books, allows it to stand nonetheless.
In short, the transnational capital flows associated with private wealth
have been well-protected from public scrutiny by both formal and
informal rules and practices over the twentieth and into the twenty-first
century. Despite recent changes in the regulatory structure designed to
identify and return sovereign assets, it seems that these legal developments
have proven insufficient to overcome the very high and sometimes
insurmountable practical hurdles that cordon off and protect the private
wealth arena. In combination with the loose standards associated with
lending to countries, this has supported a separation of the risks and
benefits of contemporary 'sovereign' borrowing. Government elites have
been able to borrow freely on behalf of an insufficiently defined sovereign
state and then use (or abuse) such funds with little oversight from
creditors, who nonetheless have generally insisted on a background norm
of full repayment. In the event that repayment proved impossible, the
state's population bore the brunt of restructuring and austerity measures,
with any stolen funds set aside and protected as personal wealth. This set
of incentives has exacerbated a perverse and pervasive dynamic of over-
borrowing, resource misallocation, and deepening inequality.
C. Creditor Ambivalence and Internal Conflicts in the Banking Establishment
If sovereign state officials with absolutist predispositions have
managed to have their cake and eat it too, they have not been alone in this
enjoyment. The practice of lending to and collecting from sovereigns has a
long and sordid past, and high government officials have long used bank
accounts and other mechanisms to carve out and protect a portion of
arguably public wealth as private. One way to rein in this tendency would
be to put such officials (and their finances) at personal risk through the
processes of debt collection and asset recovery, at least when they over-
borrow in the name of the state but do not direct those funds to the state's
43. Id. at 116.
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well-being.44 This would very explicitly tie any illicit upside of sovereign
borrowing back to a downside-especially important when other measures
of official accountability are lacking. One can imagine such an approach-
eventually taken up in certain instances by vulture funds, as discussed
below-being attractive to many creditors, as it would thereby open up an
additional asset pool for collection. Given such creditor interest, at least in
theory, why has such a strategy not been more widespread?
We often think of legal strategy as resulting from the diligence and
creativity of clever lawyers and their clients. This is clearly true, and I note
below the sui generis nature of the vulture funds involved in this strain of
sovereign debt collection litigation. Still, exceptional tenacity is hardly the
entire story. Although I do not make anything close to a complete causal
assertion, I raise the possibility that internal conflicts of interest in key
segments of the international banking establishment dominant in earlier
periods of sovereign lending might be a factor. While we frequently
imagine creditors as exclusively interested in creditor-type activities-
primarily investing funds and then recovering principal plus a return it is
not always so simple. What is insufficiently commented upon, but
potentially relevant to the discussion here, is the degree to which financial
institutions have in some cases been involved on both sides of the
sovereign debt/private wealth equation. Although I do not mean to
suggest that this factor is determinative in any particular case, it could help
to explain why we have seen relatively little of this private wealth-asset
recovery strategy. It may also help to account for some degree of variation
across particular creditors in a given sovereign debt situation, as we see in
the Congo-Brazzaville case discussed more fully in Part III.
It is, for obvious reasons, exceedingly difficult to find data on whether
government officials of sovereign borrower states also have partaken in
the private wealth management services of major private financial
institutions-including institutions that may be significant participants in
the state's lending syndicates or the underwriters of its sovereign bond
issuances. Still, it is noteworthy that private lending to sovereign states
from World War II until the early 1990s generally was organized through
major international banks along the lines of Chase Manhattan, Citibank (in
its various iterations), and BNP Paribas. And many of the largest and most
internationally involved financial institutions had and continue to have
both sovereign lending departments and private client services. One would
expect the most important of these international banks to have established
long-term relationships with both sovereign state clients and their ruling
elites. The relationship with the ruling elites would be inevitable given the
44. A brief mention of veil piercing is taken up below. See infra note 54 and text associated with
notes 54-55.
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need to interact with some range of actually existing natural persons who
(ostensibly) act on behalf of, and enter into debt and other contracts for,
the underlying state.45 But these banks may have developed relationships
with the same individuals through their private client or wealth
management departments as well.
If indeed our hypothetical bank were committed on both sides of
sovereign debt and private wealth, this could create something of a bind
when it comes to questions of debt restructuring and especially asset
recovery. Ideally, it would be helpful to know more about the internal
interactions between the sovereign lending and private wealth departments
of various financial establishments, including the revenue streams and
potential synergies generated by both-fine-grained information that is
difficult to find. Yet, one can imagine how an overly aggressive stance on
sovereign debt, which might ultimately risk the need for asset recovery,
might place the financial institution in the uncomfortable position of
seeking to uncover its own private client accounts. It would, perhaps, be in
the material interest of the bank to instead seek out a more conciliatory
position on restructuring, which still recovers a respectable amount of the
debt investment (at least on paper) and kicks the proverbial can down the
road in the hopes that export markets and country prospects improve.
This course of action would provide the bank with the upfront fees
associated with a consensual sovereign debt restructuring while allowing it
to simultaneously maintain a comfortable and profitable relationship with
its 'private' client as well. Such a potential double-sided role appears to be
relevant for BNP Paribas and Congo-Brazzaville, as noted below.
This dynamic could be present even if we assume, as is likely the case,
that the revenues generated by a bank's sovereign lending business are
significantly higher than those generated by private wealth management
for sovereign officials-or even by the private wealth division as a whole.
To begin with, exposing and targeting one's own private banking clients
through sovereign debt collection would very likely eliminate not only
those clients but also undermine the department writ large. Private wealth
clients are notoriously publicity-shy-"skittish prey" who value
"trustworthiness, discretion, and reliability" very highly.46 A scandalous
lawsuit brought by the bank to openly assert the corrupt origins of its own
client's wealth would raise eyebrows among other current and potential
clients, even were their interests and funding sources more garden-variety.
45. I have written extensively elsewhere about the possible ways to conceive of this principal-
agent relationship in the sovereign context, particularly in the sovereign debt arena. See LIENAU, supra
note 13, at 20-56.
46. Harrington takes a close look at the centrality of client relations and the ways in which
wealth managers signal "trustworthiness, discretion, and reliability" through a myriad of methods. See
HARRINGTON, supra note 24, at 93. For her characterization of certain particularly elusive potential
clients as "skittish prey," see id at 99.
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Even more importantly, such a strategy would likely threaten a bank's
sovereign lending business as well: Any government officials among its
private banking clients would almost certainly be gatekeepers to the even
more lucrative sovereign debt revenue stream. Particularly if officials are
not primarily concerned with service to the public, one can easily imagine
that they would direct a government's valuable sovereign credit business to
personally preferred and trusted banking establishments.
Still, even if we assume that this dynamic helps to explain the
discretion of any given bank, enmeshed in both sovereign debt and private
client relationships with a particular set of government elites, what of other
creditors? Surely not every financial institution has been equally caught up
in such complex and potentially conflicting ties across the board. It is
perhaps surprising that we have not witnessed more frequently an
aggressive hunt for the alleged millions (or even billions) of sitting or
deposed rulers, in the mode of the more recent vulture fund efforts. Why
did most of these financial houses continue to pursue restructurings
through much of the twentieth century, even when negotiations dragged
on and there was little left to squeeze out of debtor countries?
This, too, might have something to do with the structure of credit
markets and the interactions between creditors themselves. Not only may
some banks have been enmeshed in complicated, double-sided
relationships with state borrowers and their political elites. In addition,
banks tended to be interconnected with each other through loan
syndications, in which they held participations in one loan organized by a
lead institution. As I have discussed in other writing, this not only pooled
the banks' risk but also pooled their interest and their strategy when it
came time to deal with a debt default.47 This structure may have
undermined the willingness to compromise on the part of banks as a
whole, creating something of a creditor oligopoly: if one creditor refused
to concede to a borrower's desired terms, other banks would fall in line
rather than risk jeopardizing the unified front (and threatening the chance
that other creditors would follow their lead in some other debt episode).
But, conversely, it also seemed to have a cooling effect on the most hot-
headed potential holdouts. If a bank proved too obstinate, and if it were
not small enough to simply have its loan bought out, it risked being
ostracized from future loan syndications and also potentially cut out of the
even more important interbank lending arrangements that a/so tended to
be organized by the largest banking groups.48 Thus, even if any given bank
did not have constraints vis- -vis a particular sovereign borrower-and
might have pursued a more aggressive asset recovery program in other
47. See LIENAU, supranote 13, at 156-160, 166-171.
48. See, e.g, id. at 167-68.
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circumstances-the material conditions and broader market structure of
sovereign debt in a specific moment could have limited the legal strategies
that appeared tenable.
This range of dynamics, at both the intra-bank and the inter-bank
level, thus might provide one reason why asset recovery efforts that
attempt to collect arguably private wealth to satisfy unpaid sovereign debt
frequently failed to materialize. There have been sizable sovereign debt
episodes in the past that overlapped with allegations of vast and potentially
ill-gotten wealth by leaders, including deposed leaders. Returning once
more to the 1979 Iranian example, the new regime's claims about the scale
of wealth taken from the country by the Pahlavi family were significant,
with one report alleging that the Shah had granted himself a personal
budget from the government varying from $43 million to $1 billion.49 In
addition, the family owned land and businesses in virtually every major
sector in the country-also valuable assets, though of course less liquid
and obviously bound to the territory itself 50 While continuing to live a
fairly lavish lifestyle, the family itself contested the staggering sums floated
by the Iranian government and in the popular press. According to Ashraf
Pahlavi, the deposed shah's sister, "After the death of my brother, if we
had had the $65 billion some people said we had, we would have retaken
Iran just like that."51
Interestingly, no creditors-even if they sought payment from the new
regime itself made any moves against the assets of the deposed ruling
family. Perhaps they awaited the outcomes of the new regime's asset
recovery suits and were disheartened by the results. Perhaps they were
given pause by the New York State Appellate Division's suggestion,
discussed above, that assets accumulated by the Shah while he was an
absolutist leader were properly designated as 'private.' It may also have
been due to subsequent developments, in particular the Iranian hostage
crisis and the resulting establishment of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, into
which all claims were eventually funneled. Or they may have felt the
litigation barriers were high and the chances or rewards of success were
comparatively low for other reasons, which no doubt remain relevant to
the many creditors today that decline to pursue an independent litigation
and asset recovery strategy.
Still, it is also noteworthy that pre-revolution Iran's most significant
bank relationship was with Chase Manhattan, headed by David
49. Ron Scherer, Shah's Fabled Riches: Millions? Billions?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, (Apr. 23,
1980), https://www.csmoitor.com/1980/0423/042306.html.
50. Id. Reza Shah, in exile in 1941, claimed to own 10% of the land in Iran. Id. See also William
Brarigin, Pahlaui Fortune: A Staggeing Sum, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1979, at Al.
51. Sister of Shah Nurses Bitter Memories, AUSTIN-AM. STATESMAN (Dec. 18, 1983),
https://www.newspapers.com/newspage/362866534/.
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Rockefeller, who worked extensively behind the scenes to have the Shah
admitted to the United States for medical treatment when no other
country would have him.52 There was suspicion that Chase might have
provided private wealth management services for the Shah and his family,
and Rockefeller received a question at Chase's annual meeting about the
bank's relationship with the fallen Iranian ruler. Rockefeller responded,
"Our policy is not to talk about customer relationships or even verify this
is a customer."53 However, he attempted to dismiss some of the grander
allegations, noting that, at least in the situation at issue, he might have
preferred "it was not our policy, so if I could comment further it could
dispel a lot of allegations and misconceptions that have been leveled that
are absurd"-perhaps a reference to the $56 and $65 billion numbers
circulating at the time. Through a spokesperson, the bank did note that the
Iranian government had been able to provide documents detailing only
$1.8 million moved into Chase over 11 years, and also pointed out that
even those documents had not been verified. The bank did not volunteer
additional information, beyond that captured by the Iranian documents, on
any amounts held by the Shah's family or associates.
Pulling together the strands of this section, the global financial arena
has developed in such a way as to enable a separation of the risks and the
benefits of sovereign state control. Sovereign debt norms have granted
ruling country elites access to a pool of funds with very few questions
asked, while private wealth practices enabled the classification of funds as
Cpersonal' even when accumulated in contravention of a country's own
rules and even as the country itself struggled under a debt burden. And the
historical intersection of sovereign debt and private wealth practices has
benefited not only corrupt government elites: Certain financial institutions
may also have benefited from this arrangement, working (and collecting
fees) on both sides of these transnational financial flows-and thus
developing potentially conflicting internal interests if the sovereign state
became unable to repay its debt and any question arose of how aggressive,
and how personalized, a recovery effort might become. The absence of
this type of recovery action in the Iran example was hardly an anomaly,
and in cases such as Nicaragua and the Philippines creditors generally
pushed through a series of painful reprofilings (payment extensions) and
52. Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. Deision to Admit the Shah: Keg Events in 8 Months of Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 1979, at 1, 14. Rockefeller himself downplayed any relationship, though his older
brother Nelson Rockefeller seems to have been a friend to the Shah. For a New York Times article on
this episode based on recently disclosed documents from David Rockefeller's office, see David D.
Kirkpatrick, How a Chase Bank Chairman Helped the Deposed Shah of Iran Enter the U.S., N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/29/world/middleeast/shah-iran-chase-
papers.html. An earlier presentation of the fall and the final months of the Shah's life is offered in,
among others, WILLIAM SHAWCROSS,THE SHAH'S LAST RIDE (1989).
53. Scherer, supra note 49.
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restructurings even where leaders had allegedly siphoned away significant
assets from the public treasury. Although this market structure element
hardly offers a complete explanatory picture, it suggests one possible
reason for the creditor ambivalence around aggressive and personalized
sovereign debt recovery efforts. Such ambivalence has meant that the type
of creditor due diligence and assiduous debt collection that could re-inject
risk into inappropriate sovereign borrowing practices has been sorely
lacking. Instead of dampening the tendencies of borrower country elites to
over-access international credit and push their countries more deeply into
unsustainable debt, banking interests may well have exacerbated these
dynamics.
III. A PRIVATE SOLUTION? VULTURE FUNDS AND RE-LINKING RISK
AND REWARD
If bank creditors in the late twentieth century harbored any
ambivalence about aggressively targeting the private individuals involved
with sovereign states, certain creditors working in the sovereign debt arena
more recently have gone in the opposite direction. In particular, several so-
called vulture funds have argued that the broadest plausible swathe of
assets should count as sovereign property, recoverable by legally
recognized creditors such as themselves. These efforts have involved
attempts to access the assets of state-owned or state-affiliated enterprises
and subsidiaries, which are technically separate legal and financial entities,
in a sovereign-inflected version of corporate veil-piercing.54 And, most
importantly for my purposes, these investigations have also in several cases
revealed the blurred financial boundaries not just between various state
entities but also between state organs and affiliates on the one hand and
the natural persons that staff and control them on the other-a certain,
specialized kind of sovereign veil piercing. These asset recovery efforts
have thus exposed and problematized the dividing lines between public
and personal wealth, including the ostensibly private wealth of corrupt
individuals controlling or employed by a government. In doing so, they
have retroactively re-injected an element of personal risk into
unsustainable sovereign borrowing, at least where sovereign boundaries
were crossed, effectively threatening the ability of state borrower elites to
have their cake and eat it too.
54. Generally, these sovereign veil-piercing cases focus on questions about the intermingling of
enterprise funds, control of everyday operations, and other standard alter-ego inquiries associated
with piercing the corporate veil. For a relatively recent overview of sovereign-inflected veil-piercing
as it might apply in the case of Venezuelan debt restructuring, see W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Matt
Gauthier, Venezuela as- a Case Study in (Lmited) Soverign bUabfzp, 12 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 215 (2017).
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To lay this out, I first provide an overview of how vulture funds fit
into the ecosystem of sovereign debt market creditors. I note that a
number of changes in the international arena, particularly the late twentieth
century sovereign debt market structure detailed in Part II.C above,
supported and shaped the vulture funds' litigation and settlement sub-
strategy. I then cover in closer detail how certain vulture funds-Elliot
Management subsidiaries Kensington International and NML Capital-
have brought asset collection suits that targeted the lines between private
and public wealth in their efforts to collect on the sovereign debt of
Congo-Brazzaville and Argentina, respectively. These cases, which have
remained under-analyzed, also shed light on the potential dual role of
banks working on both sides of sovereign debt/private wealth and the use
of shell corporations in sequestering and constructing such funds as
private. I lay out the context for each case, the efforts taken by the funds
to collect arguably private assets to satisfy their debt claims, and the
ultimate outcomes-settlements in both, though for different reasons.
These suits raise the possibility of a private sector contribution to
correcting the market failure of overzealous and poorly allocated sovereign
borrowing, although I discuss in Part IV below that these vulture fund
actions entail their own pathologies.
A. An Opening or the Vultures
The boundaries of the "vulture fund" moniker are hazy-and I adopt
the widely used term while acknowledging that the funds themselves are
not fond of the appellation.55 Roughly speaking, these funds can be
understood as a species of the more general class of secondary market
investors. This class of investors comprise not the original lenders to
sovereign state borrowers (i.e., in the contemporary bond market, not the
original purchasers of the issued sovereign bonds) but rather investors that
purchased the bonds and the accompanying rights to repayment from
previous creditors on what is commonly called the secondary market.
Within secondary market creditors falls the sub-class of distressed debt
investors, who purchase debt when borrowers are in distress, the default
risks (and potential rates of return) are high, and other creditors are eager
55. For a consideration of earlier waves of vulture fund litigation strategies, see Jonathan I.
Blackmanm & Rahul Mukhi, The Evolution of Modern Sovereign Debt Litigation: Vultures, Alter Egos, and
Other Legal Fauna, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47-61 (2010). The centrality of these funds to
holdout problems in sovereign debt litigation has encouraged a number of takes on their activities.
See, eg., Christopher C. Wheeler & Amir Attaram, Dedawing the Vulture Funds: Rehabilitation of a Comioy
Defense in Sovereign Debt bitiation, 39 STAN. J. INT'L L. 253 (2003); John Muse-Fisher, Comment,
Starving the Vultures: NML Capital v. Republic of Argentina and Solutions to the Problem of Distressed-Debt
Funds, 102 CAL. L. REv. 1671-1725 (2014); Jonathan C. Lippert, Note, Vulture Funds: The Reason Why
Congolese DebtMa Force a Revision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 21 N.Y. INT'L. L. REV. 1 (2008).
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to move on to other investments. As such, they provide an important
element of liquidity in the market. These distressed debt investors may be
passive investors, who purchase debt at a discount after an assessment that
any likely restructuring outcome will result in some profit, but do not plan
to participate energetically in the restructuring themselves. They may also
be more activist investors, who proactively participate in debt negotiations,
perhaps through a creditors' committee, and seek to maximize the return
to themselves but also, ultimately, end up maximizing the return to all
other creditors in the same class. So-called 'vulture funds,' at least as I
define them here, are a more extreme sub-group of even the activist
distressed debt investor. They not only purchase debt on the secondary
market at a deep discount but then also eschew the standard debt
restructuring processes used by other creditors, including other secondary
market creditors. Instead, these rogue or holdout creditors, as they are also
called, hold out for an even greater recovery on their investment, often
through aggressive litigation strategies resulting in presumptively highly
favorable, though often undisclosed, settlements. Expanding the assets
available for their separate collection efforts-or exposing and
embarrassing government officials to the point of surrender-can help
vulture funds turn a tidy profit. Their tactics have been combative to say
the least, including attempts to seize navy ships, claim foreign aid funds
intended for the debtor country's population, and hold payments to other
more cooperative creditors hostage.56 They aggressively and patiently insist
on maximum profit on their own debt investment, even if that success
depends on undermining the more collective efforts of others-all while
simultaneously claiming assets that would likely not be available absent
those collective efforts. Even among the broader class of distressed debt
investors, these entities are at the far end of the spectrum in the sovereign
debt context, embodying a singular purity of spirit and purpose.
Structurally speaking, it is hardly surprising that we live in the heyday
of the sovereign debt vulture fund. The creditor dynamics of the bank-
based sovereign lending system discussed in Part II.C above shifted
significantly with the U.S. Treasury's Brady Plan resolution of the 1980s
sovereign debt crisis. This resolution took the sovereign loans that had
been limping along on banks' balance sheets and restructured them into
bonds tradeable on the market. Since the early 1990s, bonds have been the
dominant borrowing mechanism in sovereign debt: with the assistance of
underwriters, countries issue bonds to raise capital and then, for
repayment, generally send a lump sum to a trustee bank, which in turn
forwards the payments to the bondholders on record. The bonds are
56. See, eg, Nate Raymond, Argenia Faces Crecitor Lawsuit Over U.S. Satellite Conrra, REUTERS
(Mar. 25, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-court-argentina/argentina-faces-creditor-
lawsuit-over-u- s satellite-contract-idU SL1NOMM28U20140326.
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highly liquid and may be sold many times over on the secondary market
once the state has issued the debt. This means that the debt is generally
held by untold numbers of investors. Sovereign debtors will likely have no
idea who their creditors are, and creditors are often unaware of the identity
of their fellow creditors, perhaps excepting major institutional investors
and others that are more public and active in their investment strategy in
the event of a restructuring situation. The investors are not necessarily
repeat players with any given sovereign or any other creditors; they tend to
be more discrete in their interests and may have little reason to cooperate.
In short, the time is ripe for a strategy built on purchasing deeply
discounted debt on the liquid secondary market when other investors are
fearful and then adopting a strategy with minimal regard for the sovereign
debtor, its ruling elites, or other creditors.
The material market structure is of course not the only element that
has shifted in recent decades. In addition, the global discourse highlighting
and castigating corruption is a relatively recent development, also dating
roughly to the end of the Cold War. As demonstrated by the Congo and
Argentina cases below, part of the vulture funds' broader asset collection
strategy in these cases has been to emphasize corruption not only in court
settings but also in the popular media both in major international financial
centers, where future capital might be raised, and in the sovereign
borrower states themselves, where government officials might be
embarrassed into agreeing to a settlement. Of course, corruption itself
remains widespread, still protected by layers of privacy that remain difficult
to pull back. But the narrative about its acceptability has shifted and
international actors, financial institutions, and country populations alike,
who in earlier decades displayed a higher degree of tolerance for the
practice, seem to be reaching their limits. Whether it is through numbered
Swiss bank accounts or mysterious shell companies, revelations of
siphoned funds are now more troubling to both an angry contemporary
populace and a wary IMF. As such, the shift in material creditor structures
has been joined by developments on the ideational side, where the
disconnect between actually corrupt practices and the narrative of clean
governance has further widened the opening for this vulture fund
approach. As highlighted by the Congo and Argentina cases below, an
asset recovery strategy challenging the provenance of ostensibly private
assets is now more likely to appeal to courts of various stripes and to cause
consternation among ruling elites putting on a clean show for their
domestic audiences.57 Overall, late twentieth century changes in credit
57. Furthermore, additional changes in what might be understood as the background legal and
technological infrastructure may have enabled this shift. This could include, for example, changes in
U.S. discovery rules and the development of a globalized media infrastructure, each of which would
have made the tactics of both asset discovery and public embarrassment more practicable. In some
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markets and ideational norms thus enabled the rise of aggressive creditors
with the incentive structure to challenge the way in which the risks and
rewards of sovereign financial control had been unlinked in modern
finance.
B. Kensington International v. Reublic of Congo
The Republic of Congo, with its capital at Brazzaville, is one of the
poorer and more troubled countries in the world. Also referred to as
Congo-Brazzaville to distinguish it from its much larger and even more
troubled neighbor, Congo-I dnshasa (or the Democratic Republic of
Congo), it gained independence from France in 1960 and suffered a series
of coups and coup attempts, eventually ending with an assassination of
leftist leader Marien Ngouabi in 1977.58 Current president Denis Sassou-
Nguesso gained power two years later, effectively establishing a pseudo-
Marxist single party state until the end of the Cold War.59 In line with the
post-Cold War pressure toward multi-party democracy, Sassou-Nguesso
agreed to constitutional reforms and new elections in 1992. Unsatisfied by
his subsequent loss of power to a longtime rival, he decided to reclaim
power by force, assembling a private militia and launching the Congolese
civil war. He eventually retook the presidential palace in 1997, with
fighting continuing until 1999.60 Through a series of problematic elections
and constitutional revisions, Sassou-Nguesso remains in power to this
day-among the longest-ruling autocrats in the world.
61
cases, of course, Paul Singer of Elliott Management may have helped to 'improve' the ground
himself, such as by successfully lobbying to undo champerty laws in New York State. See Martin
Guzman, Wa/I Street's Worst Vulture Hedge Funds are Making a Killing by Undermining the Global Economy,
QUARTZ (June 17, 2016), https: qz.com/ 707165/wall- streets -vulture-hedge- funds -are-making- a-
killing-by-undermining-the-global-economy/ (noting the elimination of champerty for high-value
transactions in New York State and the connections between Paul Singer and the sponsoring state
senator).
58. Ngouabi Dies of War Wounds" Congolese Leader Slain by Attackers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1977, at
1,9.
59. See, e.g, Dennis D. Cordell, Congo Since Independence, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/place/Republic-of-the-Congo/Congo-since-independence (last visited
Apr. 28, 2020).
60. The Rise and Fall and Rise of Denis Sassou-Nguesso, CNN (Oct. 16, 1997),
http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9710/16/sassou.nguesso.profle/index.html. The full text of the
1999 agreement ending hostilities is available through the Kroc Institute for International Peace
Studies. See Agreement on Encng Hostilities in the Republic of Congo, Univ. of Notre Dame, Kroc Inst. for
Int'l Peace Studies, http://peaceaccords.nd.edu/wp-content/accords/Republic of Congo_-
_CPA_1999-12-29.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).
61. See, e.g, Drew Hnshaw & Emmanuel Tumanjong, Congo's President Wins Third Term: The
Result Handed Denis Sassou Nguesso, A Former Paratrooper Turned Military Dictator, Another Seven Years,
WALL ST. J., 24 (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/congos-president-wins-third-term-
1458825427; Curbing Their Enthusiasm, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL (June 12, 2009) https://www.africa-
confidential.com/article-preview/id/3128/Curbing_their-enthusiasm; William Clowes, Why Should
Anyone Listen to the Whitewashing of Congo-BrazzaTille, AFRICAN ARGUMENTS (Apr. 1, 2016),
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Although Congo-Brazzaville boasts significant natural wealth, the
country has turned to external aid and loan financing to make up for
budget shortfalls resulting from economic mismanagement and
exploitation, export commodity price volatility, corruption, and political
discord. During the difficult early 1980s, Congo's borrowing included a
number of loan contracts, totaling over $30 million, which form the basis
of the cases at issue. As the worldwide debt crisis dragged on, Congo
ceased making payments on the loans in October 1985. Beginning in 1996,
the loans were purchased from the original lenders by Kensington
International LLC, a fund registered in the Cayman Islands and owned by
Elliot Associates International, the (infamous) hedge fund group
incorporated in Delaware and headquartered in New York, specializing in
distressed debt and hardball tactics.62 Based on this debt, which
Kensington doubtless purchased at a deep discount, it began contacting
Congo in 1997, during the civil war, requesting full payment of the debt. It
then brought suit in England, hoping that a court imprimatur would
encourage payment, and eventually obtained four English court judgments
between December 2002 and January 2003. As of August 2005, the total
amount of these court awards based on the original $30 million loan
contracts was $121,365,437.70, with interest accruing at a daily rate of
$22,008.23.63
Beginning in 2005, Kensington launched the most aggressive phase of
its recovery effort: instead of seeking voluntary, if court-ordered, payment
from Congo-or participating in collective debt restructuring efforts along
with other creditors-it would seize Congolese assets wherever they might
be found. The difficulty, of course, lay in locating those assets and then
gaining control over them. Congo had by then emerged as a major oil
producer, though its significant sales still proved unable to meet its
population's needs, its elites' wants, and its creditors' claims. As such,
Kensington turned its attention to intercepting and seizing either the oil
itself or payments made for that oil.
As part of this effort, Kensington targeted a number of transactions
conducted by companies, incorporated in various locations, that were
owned by or otherwise affiliated with the Congolese state or senior
officials and advisors. In each case, it argued that senior officials had
established a series of shell companies in order to disguise the flow of
Congolese oil out of the country and the stream of payments back in. This
process, Kensington suggested, served a dual purpose: First, it hid
Congolese assets from creditors seeking recovery. And, as a bonus, it also
https: //africanarguments.org/ 2016 04/ 01/why-shotud- anyone-lsten-to-the-hypocrical-
whitewashing-of-congo-brazzaville/.
62. Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Itoua, 505 F.3d 147, 151-52 (2d Cir. 2007).
63. Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Congo [2005] EWVHC (Comm) 2684 [1] (Eng.).
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hid the disappearance of a portion of these assets from the scrutiny of
both the Congolese public and international actors concerned about
corruption. Kensington effectively contended that payments made to or
through those companies were really destined for Congo-Brazzaville, and
so constituted Congolese assets that should be handed over to creditors to
satisfy the English court judgments.
The facts at the center of a major U.K.-based recovery effort illustrate
these dynamics nicely. Denis-Christel Sassou-Nguesso, the son of the
president, ran Cotrade, which sold Congolese oil on the international
market and was a wholly owned subsidiary of the country's state-owned oil
company, Societg Nationale des Pgtroles du Congo ("SNPC. 64 Cotrade
entered into a contract with Africa Oil & Gas Corporation ("AOGC"),
which in turn signed a contract with Sphynx Bermuda-though both
AOGC and Sphynx Bermuda were private ventures owned or controlled
by Denis Gokana, who was at the time of the transactions (and through
much of the litigation) the President and Director General of SNPC and a
Special Advisor to the Congolese president on oil issues.65 Sphynx
Bermuda then sold the oil to Glencore, an English company that then
promised the oil to BP in a standard commercial contract.66 Upon
discovering the shipment in transit on the 'Nordic Hawk' crude oil tanker,
Kensington argued that the chain of transacting companies constituted a
mere sham or fagade, and that the $39 million payment owed by Glencore
to Sphynx Bermuda should be treated as owed directly to Congo-
Brazzaville and therefore collectible by and diverted to creditors.67
These arguments successfully convinced the English High Court,
which found that, at least for the purposes of this oil transaction, the
companies were in effect one and the same.68 The court emphasized that
some reason must exist for interposing additional entities into the chain of
transactions, stating that, "The idea that SNPC . . . in the Congo would
happily give away profits to a private middle man when they were perfectly
capable of selling the oil itself to established purchasers . . . is fanciful."
69
Justice Cooke also highlighted the bewildering accounting associated with
the transactions. He noted of one company, "An examination of its bank
statements reveals that there was virtually no connection between the cash
passing through its bank accounts and the sums it should have received for
64. Id. at para. 3.
65. Id. at paras. 3, 8.
66. Id. at paras. 2, 3(ill-iv).
67. Id. at paras. 5-7.
68. Id. at paras. 55, 59. Justice Cooke's opinion expressed that, given the overlapping nature of
control and the fact that the same individuals (most notably Mr. Gokama) should somehow be
negotiating the sale on behalf of parties with ostensibly opposing interests, the sale would effectively
"be the result of negotiation and agreement between the very same people." Id. at para. 62.
69. Id. at para. 119.
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the oil it sold."70 And perhaps even more could have been found, as the
opinion further pointed out the difficulty in obtaining court-ordered
records from the chain of companies involved in the transaction,
suggesting that the companies "deliberately sought to conceal
documents."
71
The court noted the possibility of a dual purpose for these
transactions: "Whilst all these companies remain shrouded in some
mystery, I conclude that [they] can only have been to protect oil or
proceeds from attachment, unless there be some other nefarious
purpose."7 2 Overall, the court found that the transactions were "cosmetic"
and "may have provided some scope for personal enrichment"7 3 and again
emphasized that the structures could be read in two ways: "The conclusion
to be reached is that either there was blatant corruption ... or this was an
arrangement which SNPC and Cotrade sanctioned at the highest level."
74
Of course, the duality suggested here between personal enrichment and
state retention of funds does not entirely hold-it is not the case that the
structures were either constructed to further corruption or shield funds
from creditors. Retaining a larger portion of oil sale proceeds for the state
itself hardly means that those proceeds would assist the underlying
population; such proceeds could also augment the pool of money available
to siphon away through additional transactions at a later date. Nonetheless,
the court ultimately decided that, "Whatever personal benefits [Mr.
Gokana] may also have obtained, the primary objective here . . . was to
interpose a company between Cotrade [the Congolese oil company
subsidiary] and the buyer of oil in the international market."75 Justice
Cooke surmised that unexplained funds left in various bank accounts were
effectively "payment for services rendered" by Mr. Gokana, albeit in an
unconventional format.7 6 The court suspected that even more elevated
state officials approved of this payment structure, noting the likelihood
that "the higher echelons of the State apparatus were agreeable to the
70. Id. at para. 89.
71. Id. at para. 22.
72. Id. at para. 120.
73. Id. at para. 140.
74. Id. at para. 154.
75. Id. at para. 92. Similarly, on the Sphynx companies, it noted, "I find that the main reason for
the structure was its privacy, but not for himself as such. The reason was the desire for secrecy and
the concealment of any legal or formal connection between the Sphynx companies, or himself and
the State of the Congo." Id. at para. 113. See also id. at para. 146 ("It is plain that this was done for the
benefit of the Congo since there is no other reason which could explain it. Wholesale corruption on
the part of Mr. Gokana was not put forward as an explanation and whilst Kensington suggested there
was some siphoning of monies from the Congo through the use of this structure, it is plain in my
judgment that the structure was designed and operated to conceal the fact that it was the Congo ...
which was selling the oil in the international market and receiving the proceeds for it. Mr. Gokana
was not activating this scheme primarily for his own benefit but for the benefit of the Congo.")
76. Id. at para. 213.
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personal receipt by him of some monies."7 7 After determining that the
payment structures effectively disguised the receipt of assets by the state,
the court decided that Kensington was "therefore entitled to final Third
Party Debt Orders in respect of the purchase price for the cargo."78
Kensington's efforts to collect ranged well past the U.K. and indeed
implicated a number of cross-border financial transactions involving
Congolese oil. In New York, it launched a Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) suit against SNPC, Bruno Jean-
Richard Itoua (SNPC's Chief Executive and later the Minister of Oil and
Hydraulics), and also the French bank BNP Paribas. It alleged "a
conspiracy to misappropriate the resources, including oil, of [the Congo]
for the private use of allegedly corrupt public officials and to facilitate and
conceal that misappropriation, all at the expense of the Congolese people
and of legitimate creditors like Kensington."7 9 In particular, it claimed the
existence of a problematic oil prepayment scheme, in which BNP Paribas
loaned Congo-Brazzaville approximately $650 million in exchange for an
SNPC pledge to deliver oil at a later date. But it contended that ultimately
the Congo delivered closer to $1.4 billion worth in oil to the bank, which
allowed the bank to assist in "[diverting] oil revenues from the Republic of
Congo into the pockets of powerful Congolese public officials, while at
the same time protecting both the oil and the oil revenues from seizure by
legitimate creditors."80  Kensington argued that this significant
overcollateralization was achieved through agreements between "sham
intermediaries," similar to those detailed in the English case, which were
part of a corrupt enterprise "to shield a substantial portion of Congo's oil
revenues from both oversight and attachment by creditors."81
Judge Preska, in the Southern District of New York, denied the SNPC
and other defendants' motion to dismiss based on the Foreign Sovereign
77. Id. He surmised further that, "Mr. Gokana was not acting for himself in all of this (although
he may have gamed some personal benefits) but in his capacity as President and DG of SNPC and
Special Adviser to the President of the Congo in oil." Id. at para. 194.
78. Id. at para. 201. Note that the English court shied away from any specific finding that the
corporate vehicles and accounts were designed primarily to hide self-dealing. Indeed, such a finding
might have been more inflammatory and was not necessary for the questions of how the Nordc
Hawk funds should be directed and, in particular, if they could be accessed by the petitioning
creditors. Instead, the court focused on how such structures could obscure state funds from loan
recovery efforts.
79. Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Societe Nationale des Petroles du Congo, No. 05-cv-5101(LAP),
2006 WL 846351, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2006). Note that this opinion misspells the bank
defendant as "BNP Parnibas" but I will use the correct spelling of "BNP Paribas."
80. Itoua, 505 F.3d at 152-53. See also the argument that this arrangement was "explicitly
intended to enable BNP Paribas to deliver Congo's oil into the hands of international buyers and
deliver the sales proceeds back to the [Congolese President] Sassou-Nguesso regime without
interference from Congo's unpaid creditors and without oversight from anyone outside the regime's
inner circle." Id
81. See Socite Nationale des Petroles du Congo, 2006 WL 846351, at *1 (quoting Kensington
International's complaint).
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Immunities Act (FSIA) and for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to
state a RICO claim. She held that the FSIA's commercial activity exception
applied, and that Kensington had presented sufficient evidence on
jurisdictional and RICO claim grounds to survive a motion to dismiss.
82
She also proved less coy than Justice Cooke in referencing the grand
corruption claims embedded in Kensington's arguments, speaking to the
social interest in curbing leaders who "loot their countries, or accept
bribes, or steal from their people."8 3 The Second Circuit reversed in part
and vacated in part, holding without any political commentary that SNPC
was in fact immune under the FSIA and remanding to the district court to
consider in the first instance whether individual officials such as Mr. Itoua
were covered by the FSIA.84 In appealing a related decision in favor of
Kensington on the English court judgment, Congo requested the higher
court to reassign the matter to a different judge due to Judge Preska's
"hostility towards the Congo." Here the Second Circuit denied the appeal,
noting further that "should the Congo persist in its pattern of obstruction
and recalcitrance, it may find that more and more judges seem hostile."
85
Although English and New York courts tended to issue the initial
judgments, in line with the terms of the original loan contracts and the
litigation theories available, Kensington pursued a highly international
recovery and pressure effort. For example, in the British Virgin Islands,
Kensington successfully liquidated two corporations embedded in a larger
map of companies with ties to the Congo. The court found that these
private companies constituted alter egos of the Congo, part of "a
convoluted and currently commercially inexplicable structure" implicating
the ownership and profits of a Congolese oilfield.8 6 The Eastern Caribbean
Supreme Court determined that the object of the structure involved the
concealment, through the two companies, of a prefinancing transaction or
oil-backed loan by (again) the French Bank BNP Paribas to the Congo.87
82. Id. at *13-14.
83. Id. at *5 (quoting Sen. Levin's Oct. 11, 2001 statement on the PATRIOT Act in discussing
personal jurisdiction over Mr. Itoua).
84. See Itoua, 505 F.3d at 151 (BNP Paribas was not involved in at least a portion of the appeal,
as the FSIA was not relevant to its defense.) As noted below, Congo eventually settled and thus
rendered further appeals and decisions unnecessary.
85. Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Congo, 461 F.3d 238, 245 (2d Cir. 2006) (denying appeal from
order to post security for plaintiff costs on the basis that order is not appealable under the collateral
order doctrine). Congo's lawyers at Cleary Gottlieb also came in for a beating: Judge Preska
sanctioned the firm for attempting to dissuade a non-party witness who may have had knowledge
about Congo's shipping and oil transactions from attending a post-judgment deposition. See
Kensington Int'l. Ltd. v. Congo, No. 03-cv-4587(LAP), 2007 WL 2456993, at "1, *10 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
24, 2007); see also Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP v. Kensington Int'l Ltd., 284 Fed. Appx.
826 (2d Cir. 2008) (denying appeal and upholding sanctions).
86. Kensington Int'l Ltd. v Montrow Int'l Ltd. [2007] ECSC BVIHCV2007/004, paras. 21-22
HCI (Virgin Is.).
87. Id at para. 22.
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The court pointed out that "the interest in the oil concession was sold at a
gross undervalue," and also noted with choice wording the role of Mr.
Gokana, mentioned above as Congo's special advisor on oil and head of
the SNPC-"the same man who has been found to have orchestrated
other sham transactions and structures in Bermuda, lied, perjured himself
in Court, forged documents, obstructed justice and committed contempt
of court."88 Throughout, Kensington also took a forward-looking
approach, seeking to stop transactions that it felt might diminish the pool
of funds available for its eventual recovery. For example, in August 2002,
it obtained an injunction in the Cayman Islands that halted a pre-financing
deal with energy and commodities company Vitol for $210 million.89
And the recovery efforts became fairly unconventional, eventually
taking a highly personal turn that publicized the corruption and profligacy
of the presidential family and high officials. In particular, as part of its
efforts to uncover Congolese assets, Kensington obtained orders requiring
disclosures by a Hong Kong secretarial services company involved with
companies associated with Congolese oil.90 The disclosed documents
determined, first, the existence of an Anguilla-based company called 'Long
Beach,' which had dealings with Sphynx Bermuda-of the English Nordic
Hawk case mentioned above-and whose concealed beneficial owner was
Denis Christel Sassou-Nguesso, son of the president and head of the
Cotrade marketing arm of the national oil company.91 The documents also
included detailed multi-page credit card statements indicating significant
expenditures at shops such as Christian Dior, Louis Vuitton, and Roberto
Cavalli in Paris, Hong Kong, Dubai, and Marbella.92 And, finally, the
documents provided evidence that Long Beach had paid the credit card
accounts of Sassou-Nguesso t  cover these personal expenditures.
93
Although a Hong Kong court only allowed the documents to be used
for debt recovery, Kensington nonetheless passed the documents to a
London-based anti-corruption group, Global Witness, which then posted
them on their website, eventually generating a number of news articles in
the global press-a chain of events that was doubtless part of
88. Id. at para. 57. Counsel for the companies asserted that the court should consider how
Kensington obtained the loans in the first place. However, Judge Hariprashad-Charles found "this
was not relevant to the application before me. The basis on which KIL established itself as a creditor
of Congo was based on four judgments of the English Commercial Court which was disclosed." Id.
at para. 49.
89. Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Congo [2005] EWHC (Comm) 2684 [116] (Eng.).
90. Long Beach Ltd. v. Global Witness Ltd. [2007] EWJHC 1980 [11] (Eng.).
91. Id. at para. 49.
92. See Glob. Witness, supra note 1; Congo Leader Son Fai/s in Gag Bid, BBC NEWS (Aug. 15,
2007), http: //news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/ africa/ 6948281.sm.
93. See Long Beach Ltd. [2007] EWHC 1980 [49]. Also indicated was the existence of a second
Anguilla company, Elenga Investment Limited, which through a similar beneficial ownership
structure paid the credit cards of Blaise Elenga, formerly general counsel for SNPC and at the time
deputy head of Cotrade. See Global Witness, supra note 1.
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Kensington's debt collection plan, broadly writ.94 Unsurprisingly, Sassou-
Nguesso and Long Beach sued in Hong Kong and in England to have the
documents removed, and also sought to keep private their efforts to
remove the documents from public view.95 Justice Burton of the London
High Court demurred, not only determining that press freedom trumped
the right to privacy but also commenting that Long Beach had dealings
with another company (Sphynx Bermuda) found "to have entered into
sham purchases and resales of Congolese oil which gave an obvious
opportunity for personal gain on the part of those controlling those
companies."96 Justice Burton further noted of the individuals involved
that, "The specified documents, unless explained, frankly suggest that they
are [unsavory and corrupt] .... There is no obvious reason why [Sassou-
Nguesso] should not publicly explain that the transactions shown by these
documents are consistent with his honest performance of his duties ...
and his disclosed personal income."
97
Kensington itself enthusiastically participated in the public
embarrassment of Congo's leaders, pointing out their profligacy in the face
of the country's poverty. Jay Newman, Elliott Management's senior
sovereign debt portfolio manager at the time, highlighted during Congo's
2006 debt relief effort that the Sassou-Nguesso New York hotel suite cost
cmore per day than the average Congolese makes in a decade."98 He also
took the opportunity to deride debt cancellation campaigners: "It is oh-so-
chic to rock out with [international megastar] Bono and Kofi Annan (the
UN secretary general) and there may be instances in which debt
forgiveness makes sense. But rather than forgiveness, for some countries
the right answers are political sanctions and, when warranted, criminal
prosecutions."99 While criminal sanctions may indeed be valid in certain
circumstances, these funds have thus far not expended much energy on
clarifying when debt forgiveness does in fact make sense or on pursuing
94. See, eg., Roger Parloff, Judge: Vulture Fund Leaked Documents to Human Rg&ts Group, FORTUNE
(Aug. 21, 2007), https://fortune.com/2007/08/21/judge-vulture-fund-leaked-documents-to-human-
rights-group/; Lydia Polgreen, Unlikely Aly Against Congo Republic Graft, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2007),
https: //www.nytines.com/ 2007/12/ 1 O/world/ africa/ lOcongo.htnl.
95. See Long Beach Ltd. [2007] EWHC 1980 [17]. While the Congolese officials succeeded in
Hong Kong, Global Witness responded to their attorneys' demand with the comment that, "You
enclose what purports to be an injunction from a Hong Kong Court, which is under the sovereignty
of China. Here in the United Kingdom we have the principle of free speech; for all that you are paid
to infringe this principle, we nonetheless believe that any English judge will uphold it." Id. at para 18.
The lawyers hired by Sassou-Nguesso and Long Beach specialized in privacy issues and had
presumably previously represented political figures, as well as the likes of Britney Spears and Naomi
Campbell. See Parloff, supra note 94.
96. See Long Beach Ltd. [2007] EWHC 1980 [49]. On freedom of expression and
public/journalistic interest in publications, see id. at paras. 28, 41, 45.
97. Id. at para. 52.
98. Tony Allen-Mills, Congo Leader's £169,000 Hotel Bill, SUNDAY TIMES (Feb. 12, 2006),
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/congo-leaders-pound169000-hotel-bill-z7k8hwdk9lb
99. Id.
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poverty alleviation more directly. Indeed, they seem not to have come
across a debt cancellation program they liked.
Of course, public relations efforts abounded on both sides, and the
Republic of Congo spent approximately $3.3 million over 2006-2007 to
hire lobbyists in the United States in an effort to highlight the depravity of
vulture funds and expose the political dealings of their leadership.100
Indeed, there is every indication that Congolese officials felt justified in
avoiding and denying recovery by Kensington: As part of the English
Nordic Hawk case, the Caisse Congolese d'Amortissement, a department
within the Congo Ministry of Finance, openly stated that it would not
make payment to Kensington or other aggressive creditors who had
purchased Congolese debt until after the conclusion of general debt relief
negotiations.101 Congolese officials apparently considered defensible the
establishment of shell corporations to obscure the flow of state assets, and
also seemed to believe that their own domestic audience would support
such efforts. News outlets reported that, in interviews in the Republic of
Congo, officials said they had arranged the complex transactions to avoid
aggressive creditors, with the country's information minister asserting,
"We are in a war, and we have to defend ourselves."102 Congo-
Brazzaville's prime minister himself admitted in January 2006 that the
country had taken to defensively hiding its oil revenues to escape creditor
recovery efforts. The officials launched broad counterattacks as well:
Around the same time, President Denis Sassou-Nguesso accused a French
investigation into alleged embezzlement by him and President Teodoro
Obiang of the Equatorial Guinea of being "racist" and "colonial." 103 And
Congo was hardly alone in decrying the vulture funds, with other major
international figures speaking of them in similarly uncomplimentary
language.104
Particularly in reviewing these allegations and counter-allegations,
along with the multiple court statements that were hardly complementary
to the country's leadership, one might assume that Brazzaville took an
intransigent stance with creditors more generally. However, this is hardly
100. See Polgreen, supra note 94.
101. Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Congo [2005] EWHC (Comm) 2684 [51] (Eng.).
102. See Polgreen, supra note 94.
103. See BBC NEWS, supra note 92; French Congo Fraud Probe 'Racist,' BBC NEWS (July 6, 2007),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6276300.stm. Of course, it is entirely possible that the
investigative and prosecutorial choices of which cases to pursue have racial and colonial overtones
while still uncovering information useful to the populations on the ground.
104. For example, Gordon Brown during a speech at the UN as Chancellor of the Exchequer
and IMF Governor for the UK made a point to "condemn the perversity where Vulture Funds
purchase debt at a reduced price and make a profit from suing the debtor country to recover the full
amount owed-a morally outrageous outcome." Gordon Brown, Chancellor of the Exchequer &
IMF Governor for the U.K, Speech at the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on
Children: Financing a World Fit for Children (May 10, 2002).
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the case. While evading Kensington's aggressive recovery efforts, the
Republic of Congo simultaneously entered into a consensual and widely
appreciated debt negotiation with its other bondholders.105 Indeed, after
1999, the trend in sovereign debt had been toward unilateral exchange
offers-with Pakistan, Ecuador, Argentina, and others partaking-in
which sovereigns simply presented new restructuring terms to
bondholders without negotiating in advance, generally once the parameters
of an appropriate restructuring framework had been vetted by the IMF.106
Creditor representatives decried these unilateral offers and called the
Congo-Brazzaville restructuring, which was a relatively more dialogic and
consensual process, "a ray of sunshine cutting through the shadows cast
by the cases of Ecuador and Argentina."107 To help the sun shine brighter,
Congo paid for the expenses of the Creditors' Committee and its legal
advisors, ultimately culminating in an outcome that the Committee "was
pleased to endorse" and garnering market approval with a ninety-two
percent participation rate.108  Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Creditors'
Committee was led by Congo's longtime principal financial institution-
and fellow defendant in Kensington's asset recovery suits-BNP Paribas.
The Congo-Brazzaville case is interesting for, among other things,
highlighting the way in which creditors' perspectives can differ significantly
on the same restructuring. To some creditors, the country and its ruling
officials served as a model of responsible debtor action, working
conscientiously toward a negotiated solution. But vulture funds, relying on
legal argument as well as atmospherics and more global accusations,
charged the state's leaders with hiding and mis-valuing assets to short-
change creditors and enrich themselves. Ultimately, Kensington's
international asset search and associated negative publicity effort did bear
fruit: The Republic of Congo agreed to a settlement in 2007 for an
undisclosed amount.109 This settlement obviated the outstanding court
appeals and brought to a close the fund's recovery efforts, including their
attempts to uncover illicit financial flows into private coffers. Still, the
Congo case offers a window into one mechanism for re-linking the risk
and reward of controlling sovereign capital flows, by putting in peril the
105. For a detailed discussion of the restructuring and its terms, see generally Mark B. Richards,
The Republic of Congo's Debt Restructuring: Are Sovereign Credhiors Geing Ther Voice Back? 73 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 273 (2010).
106. To add insult to injury, some of these exchanges also used exit consents, whereby exiting
bondholders voted to change (and worsen) the terms of old bonds still held by reluctant creditors.
See, eg., Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, Exit Consents in Sovereign BondExchanges, 48 UCLA L. REV. 59
(2000); Richards, supra note 105, at 274-75, 280.
107. See Richards, supra note 105, at 298.
108. Id. at 278.
109. Anu Narayanswamy, Corruption Charges Pro' t Congo to Lobby Congress, SUNLIGHT FOUND.,
(Sept. 25, 2009), https://sunlightfoundation.com/2009/09/25/corruption-charges-prompt-congo-
to-lobby-congress/.
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usually protected private financial sphere of a borrowing country's high
officials in the face of debt collection and asset recovery.
C. NML v. Agentina, Private Wealth Version
A similar window is provided by the most famous sovereign debt
default and restructuring in recent years: Argentina-the "trial of the
century," at least in some corners of international finance.110 The
Argentinian economy was unparalleled in South America at the beginning
of the 20th century and remains one of the largest on the continent, with
significant natural resources and an educated population. But many
decades of external economic shocks, internal mismanagement of all
stripes, and political instability and self-dealing across both military and
democratic governments has taken its toll. Despite significant growth in
the 1990s, by the start of the 21st century, rampant corruption, an
untenable currency peg, and spreading financial crisis had brought the
economy to its knees. Unemployment soared over 20%, widespread
hunger was reported, and the economy as a whole contracted by one fifth.
In the face of this depression, with the country cycling through five
presidents in two weeks, the government defaulted on $100 billion of
debt-the largest default the world had ever seen.111
Despite its financial pariah status and in the face of dire predictions in
international financial centers, the country began to recover in the
following years, in part due to the cooling of global financial contagion and
greater demand for Argentina's exports, especially from China.112
Particularly in light of increased poverty and inequality, the post-2003
government of Ngstor irchner and then eventually Cristina Fern~ndez de
1I-rchner prioritized social spending and, according to the World Bank,
made significant strides in reducing poverty and inequality.113
110. Joseph Cotterill, Bad Day to Be a Recalitrant Sovereign Debtor, FIN. TIMES: ALPHAVILLE (June
16, 2014), https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2014/6 /16/1878332/bad-day-to-be-a-recalcitrant-sovereign-
debtor/.
111. For a broad overview of this and earlier history, see, among many others, Chronology:
Argentina's Turbulent History of Economic Crises, REUTERS (July 30, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/
article/ us- argentina-debt-chronology/ chronology- argentinas- turbulent-history- f-economic-crises-
idUSKBN0FZ23N20140730. For a more detailed overview of issues leading to the depression, see,
e.g, Argentina's Collapse: A Decline Without Parallel, ECONOMIST (Feb. 28, 2002),
https://www.economist.com/special-report/2002/02/28/a-decline-without-parallel.
112. See, eg., Chronology, supra note 111.
113. According to a World Bank study, after the 2001 crisis, "the reduction in inequality
accounted for 40 and 50 percent of the decline in extreme and moderate poverty, respectively' and
noted that the expansion in the coverage of government cash transfer programs was an important
contributing factor. Skilled Labor Force and Cash Transfer Programs, Key to Decline Inequalip in Argentina
[sic], WORLD BANK (Jan. 18, 2013), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013
/01 /18/lucha-contra-desigualdad.
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Unfortunately, as detailed below, corruption allegations, high inflation, and
a range of other maladies continued and intensified.
Relatively early in its recovery from the depression, the government
developed a plan to restructure the vast majority of its debt through a
unilateral exchange offer, initially in 2005 and again in 2010, eventually
converting nearly 93% of its debt to new discounted bonds.
114 The
country could not pay all of its creditors in full and, indeed, on average the
creditors that participated in the exchange took a 65% haircut. Vulture
funds, however, saw opportunity: Given the absence of a sovereign
bankruptcy regime, these more aggressive creditors could purchase debt
on the secondary market and then litigate to take advantage of the
country's remaining resources to not only avoid losing money but rather
make a substantial profit.
The various attempts made by the most prominent of these funds,
NML Capital Ltd. (another subsidiary of Elliott Management), to obtain a
judgment and then enforce it against the country's assets have been well-
detailed in the popular press and the scholarly literature. Among the most
famous recovery efforts have included an attempt to seize a fully staffed
Argentine navy training ship docked in Ghana, claim satellite launch
contracts with Elon Musk's SpaceX,115 block the country's payments to
the IMF, and access central bank reserves held in the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York.116 And, of course, NML convinced U.S. federal Judge
Thomas Griesa to adopt a novel and much-discussed interpretation of the
pan passu clause, the loan contract term that guarantees ratable payment
across creditors in the same class. On this basis, the court enjoined
Argentina and its trustee bank from sending other, cooperating creditors
their agreed-upon, restructured bond payments unless NML was paid in
full plus interest, effectively pushing Argentina into unintended default
with all of its creditors again.117
While maneuvering in New York at the level of contract
interpretation, NML also pursued a recovery strategy akin to that displayed
by its sister company Kensington against Congo-Brazzaville. And this less-
114. In doing so, it helped to cast a "long shadow" over creditors' hopes for the same more
significant voice they had previously enjoyed in restructuring negotiations, as mentioned above.
Richards, supra note 105, at 289.
115. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Space Exploration Techs. Corp., No. 14-cv-02262(SVW), 2015 WL
1334291, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2015) (finding launch service rights immune from attachment and
execution under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and granting defendants' motion to dismiss).
116. Noted in, among others, EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463 (2d Cir. 2007)
(holding for Argentina).
117. NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d Cir. 2013). The situation was
considered so dire that a group of international banks, including those owed the restructured (and
now defaulted) payments, contemplated arranging financing through a third-party settlement. See also
Erik Schatzker et al., Banks Said to be Forming Argentine Debt Buyer Group, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 8, 2014),
https: //www.bloomberg.com/news /articles/ 2014-08-07/banks-said-to-be- arranging- argentine-debt-
buyer-group.
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commented on aspect of the Argentina litigation may well have been even
more stress-inducing for its high officials. Again using sovereign debt
collection to put at risk ostensibly private wealth, NML petitioned a
district court in Nevada to allow discovery into 123 shell companies
organized for Lfizaro Bfiez, an Argentinian businessman who had been
accused of laundering at least $65 million for high government officials.118
The companies were Nevada entities incorporated through a local affiliate
of the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca,119 which later became
famous as the face of the global Panama Papers scandal surrounding the
use of shell companies and holding structures to facilitate money
laundering and tax evasion for high-flying and often powerful clients.120
Lfizaro Bfiez first came to light through an investigation by Argentinian
television journalist Jorge Lanata, who produced an April 2013 series titled
La Ruta del Dinero K (or "The K Money Route") that alleged the existence
of shady financial dealings between Bfiez and the Kdirchner presidential
family.121 In particular, the investigation claimed that Bfiez's construction
company, founded shortly before the 2003 election of Ngstor Idirchner as
president, was awarded public works contracts in exchange for paying for
(but not occupying) rooms in hotels owned by the Idirchners.122 The
resulting official investigation, headed by Argentinian prosecutor Jos6
Maria Campagnoli, reported that Bfiez laundered $65 million in state funds
through 150 Nevada corporations. Upon submitting the report to the
country's National Supreme Court of Justice, Campagnoli was promptly
removed from office.12
3
118. See, eg., Linette Lopez, Check Out This Crar Agentine Propaganda Poster With an Amecan
Judge's Head on a Vulture's Body, Bus. INSIDER (Aug. 13. 2014), https://www.businessinsider.com
argentina-judge-gries a-propaganda-poster- 2014- 8.
119. The court found that the Nevada corporation M.F. Corporate Services was both Mossack
Fonseca's agent and its alter ego in Nevada, granting the court specific and general jurisdiction to
order discovery. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 14-cv-492, 2015 WL 1186548,
at *13-14 (D. Nev. Mar. 16, 2015). Mossack Fonseca originally denied any relation between itself and
these Nevada companies, although the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists seems to
have obtained e-mails indicating the firm's efforts to actively hide the association. See, eg., Lllewellyn
Hinkes-Jones, Clients of Mossack Fonseca- A U.S. Court Revew, BLOOMBERG (May 25, 2016),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/clients-of-mossack- fonseca-a-u-s-court-
review.
120. For more on this investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists,
see generally BASTIAN OBERMAYER & FREDERIK OBERMAIER, THE PANAMA PAPERS: BREAKING
THE STORY OF HOW THE RICH AND POWERFUL HIDE THEIR MONEY (2016).
121. The series used as its hook the question of how the Kirchners' wealth increased from $1.4
million to $14.1 million, according to government filings, since they entered into power. See, eg,
Linette Lopez, Paul Singer's Next Trick Could Make the Argentine Government Wq Angrier than the Time He
Took Its Boat, Bus. INSIDER (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.businessinsider.com/singer-after-kirchner-
funds-2014-8.
122. NML Capital, Ltd., 2015 WL 1186548, at "1.
123. Id. at *2. This investigation also alleged the existence of a second money laundering
scheme involving another Argentine businessman, Cristobal Lopez, also using Nevada corporations.
Id. at *3.
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Ever vigilant, NAIL subpoenaed the corporations in Las Vegas,
arguing that they were likely those mentioned in the Campagnoli report.
The Nevada corporations all had the same registered agent, M.F.
Corporate Services, which in turn had one employee, one client-Mossack
Fonseca-and one owner, a Panamanian company also ultimately run by
Mossack Fonseca. Upon subpoena, another Mossack Fonseca- affiliated
individual responded on behalf of all of the entities, admitting that none of
them possessed their own operating agreements or regularly conducted
business within 100 miles of Las Vegas.124 M.F. Corporate Services' one
employee indicated that she received all of her directions from employees
of Mossack Fonseca.125 On this basis, NAIL suggested that there was
sufficient evidence to propound discovery on these companies, given their
links to Biez. Explicitly claiming that the allegedly private funds were in
fact public, it noted that "If Biez is convicted of embezzlement, any funds
traceable to the embezzlement scheme would be property of Argentina
available to satisfy NML's judgements against Argentina."126 Judge Cam
Ferenbach, of the U.S. District Court of Nevada, agreed to discovery,
finding in several opinions "reasonable suspicion to believe that the
K1irchners and Biez are or were in possession of Argentina's assets and
that Biez controls entities in Nevada that possess information regarding
those assets."127 The court further highlighted the principle in both U.S.
and Argentinian law that thievery cannot result in title to the property
stolen and found sufficiently reasonable suspicion, at least in the context
of allowing discovery, to believe that "Biez, L6pez [another businessman
in similar circumstances], and their companies may be thieves.128
At the same time as these Nevada cases unfolded, and concurrent with
the Argentine debt saga's final years, Argentinian prosecutors launched a
number of criminal investigations into these events.129 Indeed, as part of
124. Id. at *2.
125. Id. at *4.
126. Lopez, supra note 118 (quoting court submissions by NML). The court papers omit the
accent in Baez's name but I have included it here.
127. NML Capita, Lr., 2015 WL 1186548, at *7; see also NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of
Argentina, 2014 WL 3898021, at *5-6 (D. Nev. Aug. 11, 2014).
128. NML Capita, Ltd., 2015 WL 1186548, at *8. In addition, Judge Ferenbach agreed to make
additional information from the case publicly available, particularly in response to a motion by Jorge
Lanata-the journalist behind La Ruta del Dinero K-to unseal the deposition testimony of M.F.
Corporate Services' single employee. NML Capital Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 14-cv-
492(RFB), 2015 WL 727924, at *9 (D. Nev. Feb. 19, 2015). He stated that NML's action was
significantly important to the public, and averred that the matters could not be litigated in secret, as it
would limit the public's understanding of the court's final decision. Id. at *7. Interestingly, the court
also noted, "It requires no citation to authority to recognize that transparent credit markets are
integral to public health and safety .... The public's interest in maintaining a healthy and transparent
bond market, therefore, strongly outweighs [the opposing parties'] private interests." Id. at *8.
129. While these investigations continued, their future is currently uncertain given Kirchner's
late 2019 election to the Vice Presidency and the February 2020 death of one of the key judges
involved in the prosecutions. See, eg., Argenrrna. Citan a la expresidenta Cnsna Femdndez de Kirchner a
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the litigation in Nevada, NIL provided an expert report detailing nine
criminal investigations ongoing that connected the Kirchners, Bfiez,
L6pez, and their companies.130 Vulture fund representatives were certainly
delighted to help publicize these allegations, which amplified their efforts
to seize assets or, in the alternative, squeeze or embarrass Argentina into a
profitable settlement. And, unlike in the case of Congo-Brazzaville, where
ousting a longstanding (if still embarrass-able) autocrat seemed unlikely,
Argentina has remained a democracy, albeit imperfect, since the end of
military rule in 1983. Sufficient public pain combined with sufficient
suspicion of inordinate corruption in the political elite might help bring
about a change in administration, if not the capitulation of the current
administration. This was hardly lost on President Cristina Fernindez de
Kirchner, and the disparaging comments went in both directions, with
1irchner taking opportunities to deride the "vultures" and denounce their
efforts to destroy the country. Kirchner and her allies also directed
particular anger at Judge Griesa of the SDNY, calling him "senile"-a
statement that can't have helped the country's case in his courtroom-and
featuring him on posters as a vulture who "wants your house, your job and
your food."
131
Ultimately, the holdout litigation did outlast Kirchner's presidency. In
late 2015, Kirchner lost in the elections to the newly assembled
Cambiemos ("Let's Change") political coalition, led by Mauricio Macri,
who stated his intention to take Argentina in a different economic
direction, including through a settlement with the holdout creditors. And
although none of the facts or legal theories underpinning the case had
changed, Judge Griesa then lifted the injunction on Argentina making
payments to other cooperating/exchange creditors, noting that
"everything had changed."132 Indeed, Macri was a centrist businessman
who intended to institute reforms more in line with the preferences of
declaradn indagatona, CNN ESPANOL (Aug. 1, 2018),
https: //cnnespmol.cnn.com /2018 /08 1/ argentina-cita- a-la-expresidenta-cristina-fernmdez-de-
kirchner-a-declaracion-indagatoria/; Daniel Pilotti, Judge Who Pushed Graft Cases Against Ex-President of
Argentina Dies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2020),
https: //www.nytines.com/ 2020 02/ 04/ world/ americas /argentina-bonadio-kirchner.html.
130. NML Capita, Ltd., 2015 WL 1186548, at *7.
131. "Griesa quiere tu casa, tu trabajo, y tu comida." See Lopez, supra note 118. For
recommendations on more considered ways to default on sovereign debt, see Odette Lienau, How to
Default on Sovereign Debt, WORLD ECON. F. June 2, 2015), https://www.wefonum.org/agenda/2015/
06/how-to-default-on-sovereign-debt/.
132. This was achieved in part through the innovative use of a "conditional vacatur," which
suspended the injunctions so long as Argentina met certain conditions, such as repealing the so-called
"Lock Law" which prevented the government from making higher payouts to holdout creditors than
to other, cooperating creditors. See, e.g, Benedict Mander, How Argentina Pulled Off a Deal in Creditor
Impasse, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/88a56580-a2c5-11e6-aa83-
bcb58dld2l93.
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domestic and international business.1 33 While the population initially
seemed to allow the new government breathing room, the lack of
improvement eventually resulted in unhappiness across the political
spectrum, with unions and social activists protesting greater austerity while
some in the business community calling the government merely
"I -rchnerism with good manners."134 The economy continued to struggle
with unimpressive growth, a currency crisis, and a conflict-of-interest
scandal in the presidential inner circle (exposed, again, by Jorge Lanata of
La Ruta del Dinero Kj. 135 And Argentina returned to the IMF in May 2018
after losing access to international debt markets despite the vulture fund
settlement, receiving the largest loan package (at $57.1 billion) in the IMF's
history in September 2018.136 But after that the currency fell, inflation
remained problematically high, and the austerity measures associated with
the IMF package, which rested on overly optimistic economic projections,
harmed Macri's popularity.1 37 In October 2019, in the midst of increased
poverty and yet another looming debt crisis, Argentines voted Macri out,
with Cristina Kdirchner elected as Vice President to serve under the
presidency of Alberto Fern~ndez.138 The new Minister of Economy,
133. For example, upon taking office, Macri proposed laws that encouraged tax evaders to
repatriate their assets (for a discounted tax payment) to attract foreign direct investment. His general
move to austerity included the elimination of gas and other subsidies, with poverty levels initially
rising under his administration. Nathaniel Parish Flannery, How Serous Are Argentina's Economic
Problems?, FORBES (Dec. 19, 2016),
https: //www.forbes.com/ sites /nathanielparishflannery/ 2016/12/19 /5534/ #68bc7cd874a2
(Interview with Erasmo Mema). Although general poverty rates initially seemed to stabilize, certain
demographic segments continued to struggle, as indicated by an 8% rise in childhood poverty to 48%
in the year ending in June 2018, according to a study by the Catholic University of Argentina. See
Study: Nearly Haff of Argentina's Children Live in Poverty, TELESUR (June 28, 2018),
https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Study-Nearly-Half-of-Argentinas-Children-Live-in-Poverty-
20180628-0022.html.
134. Benedict Mander, Macn's Reform Agenda Under Strain in Argentina, FIN.L TIMES (May 31,
2018), https: //www.ft.com/ content/ 57eded86- 5f61-11e8- 9334-2218e7146b04.
135. Id
136. Uki Gonii, Agentina Gets Biggest Loan in IMF's History at $57bn, GUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 2018),
https: //www.theguardia.com/world/ sep /26/ argentina-imf-biggest-loam.
137. See, eg., Agustino Fontevecchia, Cambiemos Must Change: Argentina's Macn Needs a Rahcal
Paraigm Shift, FORBES (June 13, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sits/afontevecchia/2018/06/13/
cambiemo s -mus t-change- argentinas-macri-needs -a-radical-paradigm- shift/ #c6 f73c340554; Argentina's
Economic Woes, ECONOMIST (May 10, 2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-
economics /2018/05/ 10/ argentinas-economic-woes; Argentina's Cnisis: Where Did It A/ Go Wrong for
Macn, ALJAZEERA, (May 26, 2019), https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/countingthecost/
2019/05/argentina-crisis-wrong-macri-190525092513291.html (noting that inflation stands at
54.7%).
138. See, e~g, Sebastian Lacunza, Agentine Voters Reject Austen , Return Kirchner and the Peromstas to
Power in Presidenial Electon, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2019), https: //www.washingtonpost.com/world/
theamericas /argentina-presidential-election- as -south- americans -protest- austerity- argentines -put-it-
to-a-vote/2019/10/27/023f1260-f68d-le9-b2d2-lf37c9d82dbb story.html. The implications of
this for investors remain unclear, although it appears that bondholders are, for now, waiting to see
what the Fernandez presidency will bring. See Kenneth Rapoza, Agentina's Bonds: Good Luck Figunng
This One Out, FORBES (Nov. 7, 2019),
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Martin Guzmin, very quickly stated that Argentina will need "substantial
relief' as it structures nearly $70 billion in debt with international
bondholders.
139
In the meantime, the settlement with Argentina proved extremely
lucrative for the litigating holdout creditors. Elliot Management, through
NML Capital, ultimately pocketed at least $2.28 billion in the settlement,
estimated to be 10 to 15 times its original investment, effectively earning
101% interest per year.140 The bonds had a face value of $617 million but
had been purchased at a steep discount for about $117 million.141
Argentina did not have enough liquidity to settle the claims so, enabled by
the expiration of the SDNY injunctions and the country's return to global
credit markets, it funded the payout in part by issuing international debt.
142
One can only hope that the debt restructuring negotiations launched in
late 2019 do not lead to yet another cycle of debt default and protracted
litigation, though the historical precedent for the country and its
relationship with international capital markets is hardly encouraging.
It should be fairly clear from the preceding discussion that the two
creditor entities at the center of the Congo and Argentina litigations are
among the most antagonistic of sovereign debt vulture funds-a moniker
that arguably already denotes an unseemly degree of aggression. Indeed,
many in the sovereign debt world find little to like about these financial
entities. They are heavily criticized for shunning and then interfering with
the collective debt restructuring processes in which others participate, thus
placing greater financial burden on both fellow creditors and on the debtor
country's population in order to maximize their own profits. Yet, at least
from the perspective of the asset recovery world, there appears to be some
benefit. As the two cases suggest, the tenacity of these funds may help to
uncover and publicize the existence and mechanisms of corrupt
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/11/07/argentinas -bonds -good-luck- figuring- this-
one-out/.
139. Hugh Bronstein & Eliana Raszewski, Argentina Needs 'Substantial' Reief in $70 Billion Debt
Talks, Economy Minister Says, REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
argentin a-economy-guzm an-exclusive / exclusive- argentin a-needs -subs tantial-relie f-in- 70-billion-debt-
talks -economy-minister- says -idUSIKBN20Z 1EE.
140. Julie Wemau, How Elliott Earned Billions on Argentine Bonds at 101% Interest, WALL ST. J.:
MONEYBEAT, (Mar. 3, 2016), https://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2016/03/03/how-elliot-earned-
billions-on-argentine-bonds-at- 101 -interest/. It is unclear whether this amount is gross profit or net
of litigation and enforcement costs. Regardless, it is clearly substantial.
141. This number was based on an analysis of court records conducted by Martin Guzman, as
of writing the Argentinean Minister of Economy but at the tme a researcher at Columbia University
Graduate School of Business and a frequent writer on sovereign debt issues. See Renae Merle, How
One Hedge Fund Made $2 Billion from Argentina's Economic Collpse, WASH. POST, (Mar. 29, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2016/03/29/how-one-hedge- fud-made-2-
billion- from- argentin as-economic-collap se/.
142. Bob Van Voris & Katia Porzecanski, Argentina Debt Injuncizon to be lifted in Blow to Hedge
Funds, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-
19/ argentin a-bonds -judge- says -he-will-lift-injunc tions -on-debt-iku9ykz 3.
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transnational asset flows. They also shed light on and perhaps raise
questions about the dual role of banks working on both sides of the
sovereign debt/private wealth intersection and also the use of shell
corporations in circumscribing funds as 'personal.' If, as I suggest, global
financial norms and practices have tended to allow state rulers to capture
the benefits of unchecked rule without its perils, vulture funds have
perhaps re-introduced a valuable element of risk. The question, of course,
is whether this value ultimately is sufficient to outweigh the very high costs
that these funds impose-particularly on the citizens of sovereign debtor
states.
IV. CAPTURING BENEFITS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
ARCHITECTURE
Borrowing country officials rightly view an inability to pay sovereign
debt with some anxiety. And if the state's ruling elites have used their
positions to enrich themselves at the expense of the solvency or effective
administration of the country itself, they should ideally feel an even greater
degree of trepidation. Yet, even in cases of grand corruption, the
underlying population generally bears the brunt of any restructuring
measures while elites themselves can continue to live in ill-gotten luxury.
In this article, I have argued that the norms and rules at the intersection of
sovereign debt and private wealth have effectively enabled this disconnect
and exacerbated problematic dynamics of global indebtedness and
financial crisis. Elites have been able to augment a country's treasury
through sovereign borrowing practices that blur the lines between the
public and the private, in which creditors lend with few questions asked
and other market actors and supportive courts have largely required
repayment regardless. And, perhaps even more than in centuries past,
ruling officials have much to gain personally from such over-borrowing:
the international norms surrounding private wealth have generally
provided mechanisms for hiding assets without care for their origins-
designating such assets as 'personal' and unavailable for easy recovery by
the sovereign state or its creditors.
So-called vulture funds have in several recent cases targeted this
specific intersection, placing in jeopardy ostensibly private funds when
debtor country elites have not respected the borders between private and
public. In doing this, they raise the possibility of a private debt collection
mechanism that could-over time and if expanded-mitigate a market
failure in global finance, helping to rein in sovereign over-borrowing, at
least to the extent that it is exacerbated by the mismatched interests, risks,
and rewards of government officials and their constituents. One major
question, then, is how positive an externality is this? Is it such a benefit to
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the global financial system that we should give vulture funds freer rein,
instead of targeting their actions through reform proposals for the
international financial architecture, as is more commonly the case? How
should we conceive of the positive and negative together, and are there
mechanisms by which they could be separated out?
In this final section, I argue that, despite its potential benefits, the
vulture funds' strategy depends on a fundamentally flawed global
framework, such that ultimately any recommendation of this approach
becomes untenable. I also briefly suggest that certain of these benefits
could be captured by alternative frameworks and strategies, in conjunction
with a clarification of which principles should guide sovereign lending,
debt recovery, and private wealth protection. At the most ambitious level,
the asset collection strategies pioneered by these cases could be included in
any future sovereign bankruptcy regime, although the practical
ramifications of such an inclusion would have to be considered carefully.
At an intermediate level, I highlight how guidelines and principles that
would mitigate this market failure could be adopted more broadly and
eventually incorporated into court decisions and even into the practices of
organizations such as the IMF. In addition, provisions for this kind of
asset recovery could possibly be included in existing contractual
mechanisms for sovereign debt or even in separate private law actions,
though again the practicalities and ramifications for debt restructuring
would be complicated to say the least. Although each of these reform
approaches would require greater study and elaboration, these preliminary
suggestions raise the possibility of capturing some of the benefits of the
vulture fund approach with fewer of the detriments.
A. Encouraging Vulture Funds as a Corrective? A Benefit Built on Flaws
Recent efforts by official entities to curb grand corruption and
facilitate the return of stolen assets to their countries have had mixed
success, to say the least.143 On both the corruption exposure and the
recovery front, the self-interested efforts of vulture funds have in some
cases been more effective. Frustrated by these disappointing outcomes,
asset recovery scholars such as Jason Sharman have gone so far as to
suggest that vulture funds simply be welcomed as key players in this effort,
even if they retain all the recovered funds. Sharman has noted, "If a
vulture fund takes someone corrupt to court and strips them of $100m
then it doesn't make the victim country any richer but it provides some
accountability and a deterrent. Other would-be criminals think: well even if
I escape my own government, there are these firms that will come after my
143. This is presented more fully in the discussion of private wealth norms in Part II.B. above.
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money no matter where it is in the world."144 He suggests that this
'baptists and bootleggers' coalition, while not especially morally satisfying,
might in the long run be more effective at curbing corruption through a
strong deterrent effect.
145
The proposal is intriguing, and it is certainly the case that vulture
funds bring a perspective that other creditors may lack. In the Congo-
Brazzaville case, consensually restructuring creditors seemed to present the
country and its leaders as a shining ray of light in the darkness cast by
Argentina and other debtors.146 And it is hardly surprising that the French
bank BNP Paribas played the key role as the lead bank in Congo's lauded
restructuring negotiations. The bank seems to have a long history with
both Congo-Brazzaville and its ruling Sassou-Nguesso family. For the
country, the bank's sovereign debt department has put together plain
vanilla loans and led the charge on restructuring when required. It has also
helped to arrange secured financing mechanisms involving Congolese oil,
including the prefinancing arrangements that resulted in its being sued in a
U.S. RICO case.147 And the ruling family seems to have availed itself of
BNP Paribas's private client services, with the bank allegedly holding
private accounts and facilitating the purchase of luxury real estate in Paris
in ways that ultimately attracted the attention and ire of French anti-
bribery authorities.148 Relatively uniquely (or at least vocally) among
creditors, Kensington International called out Congo's leaders as worthy
of scorn.
However, the recommendation to welcome vulture funds more openly
into the asset recovery and anti-corruption project looks at only one side
of the international economic story. While this project is certainly
important, the vulture fund strategy depends on what many consider a
failing in the underlying financial architecture-the absence of something
like a sovereign bankruptcy regime. This connection is clear to the many
advocates of a sovereign bankruptcy equivalent (myself included), clear to
144. See David Batty, Make Profit Motive an A//y in Corruption Fjgh, Sys Offshore Expert,
GUARDIAN (June 2, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jun/02/profit-motive-
venture-capital- ally-corruption- fight-jason- sharman.
145. For initial responses to this proposal, see, e.g., id. (noting that Transparency International
doubted using the profit motive in this way and expressed the view that assets recovered should be
returned to the underlying population). Indeed, jurisdictions that participate in asset seizures related
to corruption frequently may keep the assets for themselves. See also, e.g, Nick Squires, San Manno
Seizes $/ 9m from Congo Dictator Who Spent $/00,000 on Crocole Shoes, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 12, 2019),
https: //www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 2019 /09 /12/ san-marino-seizes-19m-congo-dictator-spent-
100000-crocodile/.
146. See Richards, supra note 105, at 298.
147. See text associated with notes 79-86 supra.
148. These cases continued well past this earlier struggle with Kensington. See, e.g, Chine Labbe
& Bate Felix, French Court Orders Seizure of Properties Tied to Congo President's Famf, REUTER (Sept. 29,
2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us- france-congo-corruption/french-court-orders-seizure-of-
properties- tied-to-congo-presidents- family-idUSKCNORT2HL0 150929.
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creditors that have opposed moves in this direction, and clear to courts
dealing with sovereign debt issues. In Kensington's case against Congo-
Brazzaville, the Second Circuit highlighted precisely this point:
The Congo argues that, because it does not have funds to pay all
of its debts, taking judicial notice that the Congo may nevertheless
pay this debt is error. In other words, the Congo claims that it is
unwilling to pay its debts in the name of restructuring its entire
debt portfolio, and thus "paying Kensington or other similarly
situated individual creditors would have the perverse effect of
encouraging the Congo's other creditors to litigate their claims in
hopes of securing a windfall, rather than participating in an
equitable restructuring process." While it may be in the Congo's
interest to seek a global settlement . . . the Congo does not
squarely dispute [that it] has sufficient funds to pay here. This is
not a bankruptcy proceeding.1 49
The absence of a bankruptcy regime for sovereigns-which would force
even an unwilling creditor into a collective process in which it too must
share in the burden of restructuring-is precisely what allows vulture
funds to make such significant profits.150 Thus, encouraging vulture funds
in their asset recovery efforts would, it seems, require the maintenance of
the current, highly problematic approach to sovereign debt. Indeed,
supporting an asset recovery framework against the backdrop of a flawed
underlying sovereign debt structure could serve to entrench that structure
and further strengthen the actors that rely upon and benefit from it.
Of course, holdout litigation remains the exception in sovereign debt
cases, and there is some disagreement about the broader risks and effects
of such litigation for the system more generally. Collecting against the
assets of foreign states is a notoriously difficult project and not for the
149. See Kensington Int'l Ltd. v. Congo, 461 F.3d 238, 244 (2d Cir. 2006) (denying appeal from
order to post security for plaintiff costs on the basis that order is not appealable under the collateral
order doctrine).
150. Of course, these funds also make significant profits as purchasers of distressed debt in the
context of U.S. Chapter 11 corporate bankruptcy proceedings. For different takes on this
phenomenon, see, among others, Paul M. Goldschmid, More Phoenix< than Vulture: The Case for
Distressed Investor Presence in the Bankruptc Reoganizon Process, 2005 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 191, 191-
267; Richard D. Thomas, Tipping the Scales in Chapter / : How Distressed Debt I vestors Decrease Debtor
Leverage and the Ejficag ofBusiness Reoganation 27 EMORY BANKR. DEVS. J. 213, 213- 53 (2010). This
active domestic bankruptcy-based investing strategy undermines the claim sometimes made that a
sovereign bankruptcy framework would necessarily shut down secondary markets. However, it is
perhaps a question of magnitude: There could be some decrease in the liquidity of sovereign debt
markets and some increase in borrowing costs-an outcome that might not be so bad given the
mixed consequences of readily available and relatively inexpensive capital in sovereign debt markets
historically. For one consideration of the seemingly endless capacity of countries and creditors to
make poor financial decisions, see, for example, CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF,
THIS TIME Is DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2011).
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faint of heart. It is true that older international laws and norms of
sovereign immunity have been eroded by the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act in the United States and by its relatives in other
jurisdictions. These shifts have made the assets of sovereign states
recoverable under certain circumstances, including if they are used in the
course of commercial relations.151 And, in contemporary sovereign loan
contracts, states routinely waive their claim to immunity for the purposes
of allowing creditor recovery on these contracts, making it even more
possible to render judgments against them and their assets.152 Still, actually
converting these judgments into funds without the state's acquiescence
remains difficult. There is the problem of discovering where the assets
related to a sovereign's commercial activity might be, although this
difficulty has been softened somewhat in the U.S. context by (yet) another
line of cases associated with NML's litigation against Argentina.153 And
there is the additional challenge of successfully seizing those assets,
particularly if they are not located in a jurisdiction that is relatively more
accessible and amenable to creditors.
This difficulty is one central reason why, most of the time, most
creditors to sovereign states rely on the standard, if highly imperfect,
processes of credit rationing and restructuring to manage their exposure to
risk and maximize their chances of a reasonable return on investment. If a
state has difficulty meeting its debt payments (at least its external debt
payments), it will now generally meet with creditor representatives to
attempt to arrange payments in a way that better accords with its payment
capacity. The IMF and other major financial actors will almost certainly
become involved, and of course the political voice and economic
requirements of domestic constituents play (or should play) a central role.
In this interplay of consensus, financial pressure, and power politics, the
contours of most sovereign debt restructurings can mimic the dynamics of
out-of-court restructurings for any other entity-though without, of
course, the background threat of bankruptcy that encourages collective
action in the domestic corporate context, for example.
The commentary surrounding the likely long-term impact of vulture
fund litigation has thus gone both ways. Felix Salmon, a widely read and
highly regarded commentator on sovereign debt, expressed a concern held
by many in the field at the height of the Argentina debt litigation-namely
that vulture fund actions and the subsequent court decisions were a
151. See 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2) (2018). This commercial activity exception now is understood to
include sovereign debt tramsactions, although originally this was less certain. A key decision here was
Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
152. See, e.g, Kensington Int'l Ltd., 461 F.3d at 243.
153. Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U.S. 134 (2014) (holding that the FSIA
does not immunize Argentina from post-judgment discovery of information sought by creditor in
regard to extraterritorial assets).
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"disaster" and that the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court "should be
held responsible for the fallout." 154 On the other side, an analyst at
Moody's Credit Rating Agency has argued that, despite all the hand-
wringing, sovereign debt holdout litigation is fairly infrequent and perhaps
does not warrant such concern.155 Hans Humes of Greylock Capital,
another investor very active in distressed sovereign debt though not itself a
holdout or "vulture" as I have defined it, similarly suggested that
Argentina's concerns about settling with holdouts were misplaced. He
noted, "virtually no other financial institution has the appetite or ability to
litigate like Elliott. In my estimate, the chance of anyone litigating for, and
winning equal terms, is nil." 156 Indeed, Bloomberg has called Paul Singer,
the notoriously and uniquely aggressive founder of Elliott Management,
"the world's most feared investor."157 But a more recent empirical study
has kept the conversation alive, demonstrating that creditor lawsuits have
become increasingly common over the last four decades and that legal
developments have strengthened creditors and restricted access to capital
markets.158
In any case, although the frequency of holdout litigation is of course
important-and might have bearing on how to weigh the problems of
vulture fund litigation against its possible positive externalities-frequency
alone is not a sufficient metric. Even if this type of litigation is relatively
rare, the argument that low frequency necessarily implies low import
154. Felix Salmon, Hedge Fund vs. Sovereign: How U.S. Courts are Upendzg International Finance,
FOREIGN AFF. (June 24, 2014), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-06-
24/hedge- fund-vs -s ove reign.
155. ELENA DUGGAR ET AL., MOODY'S INV'RS SERV., THE ROLE OF HOLDOUT CREDITORS
AND CACS IN SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS (2013).
https://www.moodys.com/research/moodys-holdout-creditors-have-not-been-an-obstacle-to-
sovereign--pr_270542. See also Laura Alfaro, Sovereign Debt Restructunng. Evaluating the Impact of the
Argentina Ruling, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 47 (2015) (suggesting that incentives for holdout litigation are
limited and that the court responses to Argentina are unlikely to be replicated in the future).
156. Hans Humes, Who to Blame for Argentina's Disastrous Default? Its Lawyers, Of Course,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/20/argentina-debt-
default-lawyers-court-pay-clause. This comment more specifically addressed concerns that particular
clauses in Argentina's bond contracts might result in additional creditor claims. The loan clauses
themselves were "Rights Upon Future Offers" or RUFO clauses, which might have allowed other
creditors to sue for a similar outcome if any party was made a better offer in the future-a
mechanism akin to an MFN (Most Favored Nation) clause. Humes has in other contexts criticized
the actions of vulture funds, noting that they "hold the system hostage." Greg Palast, Vultures' Prey
on Liberia's Debt, BBC NEWS (Mar. 2, 2010),
http: / /news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/programmes /world newsamerica/ 8546628.stm.
157. Nabila Ahmed et al., The World's Most Feared Investor, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 7, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-elliott-management/ (calling Singer "aggressive,
tenacious, and litigious to a fault"). For more context on Paul Singer in particular, see Sheelah
Kolhatkar, Paul Singe The Doomsday Investor, NEW YORKER (Aug. 20, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/08/27/paul-singer-doomsday-investor.
158. Julian Schumacher, Christoph Trebesch, & Henrik Enderlein, Sovereign Defaults in Court
(ECB Working Paper No. 2135, 2018),
https://ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2135.en.pdPafa9da3641f789eb6395b49f3e1850b69.
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hardly follows. As is commonly pointed out in law school classrooms,
though frustratingly difficult to operationalize and study empirically, the
shadow of the law and the threat of litigation likely resolve many more
disagreements than do actual court cases. And even if seasoned
participants may consider such litigation to be less fruitful in the future-
industry insiders note that Paul Singer himself has pulled back-young and
optimistic 'wannabe' sovereign debt vultures could still maintain this
problematic dynamic, even if they lose their investors' money.159 It would
be entirely reasonable for debtor governments that have witnessed the
struggles of countries beset by litigating creditors to sidestep the pain and
capitulate to terms less favorable to the underlying population.
Anecdotally, it appears that this has been the response of some countries
to the Argentina litigation in particular.160 Such a dynamic might lead a
greater number of creditors to resist write-downs, particularly if the trend
seems to be toward states folding earlier in the face of credible litigation
threats. This could in turn undermine the likelihood of consensual
restructurings and exacerbate country debt problems in the long run.
Of course, developments in sovereign debt contracts themselves,
including the incorporation of model contract clauses published by the
International Capital Markets Association (ICMA, a key industry group for
internationally-oriented investors), should help somewhat. The greater
emphasis on collective action clauses (CACs) and aggregated collective
action clauses (or super-CACs) in sovereign debt contracts, both in
Europe and in the United States, might eventually alleviate some of the
difficulty around holdouts and creditor cooperation in restructuring.161 In
addition, the ICMA model contract terms include a new version of the
infamous pan passu clause, the more recent iteration of which effectively
rejects the approach adopted by the SDNY in the Argentina litigation.162
159. In private conversation, industry insiders suggest hat Paul Singer himself has pulled his
funds back from sovereign debt holdout litigation, particularly with the recent retirement of senior
portfolio manager Jay Newman and the tightening of bond contract language.
160. For example, Eric LeCompte, Executive Director of the debt cancellation advocacy group
Jubilee USA Network, has said there are signs that some countries are more likely to agree to
unfavorable terms than previously. Renae Merle, How One Hedge Fund Made $2 Billion from Argentina's
Economic Collapse, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/
wp/2016/03/29/how-one-hedge-fund-made-2-blion- from- argentinas-economic-co lapse/. My own
sense from listening to debtor country representatives at sovereign debt conferences and roundtables
supports this concern as well.
161. For analysis of this trend, see, for example, W. Mark Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, A People's
History of Collectie Aion Clauses, 54 VA. J. INT'L L. 51, 95 (2013); Catalin Stefanescu, Collective Action




162. See INT'L CAPITAL MKTS. ASS'N, STANDARD AGGREGATED COLLECTIVE ACTION
CLAUSES ("CACS") FOR THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SOVEREIGN NOTES (2014); INT'L
CAPITAL MKTS. ASS'N, STANDARD PARI PASSU PROVISION FOR THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF
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But a significant portion of the outstanding global sovereign debt stock
does not include these updated contract terms. And, of perhaps even
greater concern, some evidence suggests that an increasing share of
sovereign debt is now not in the form of general bond obligations but
rather through loans backed by collateral such as future commodity
reserves or other key income-generating assets, and therefore is likely to be
more difficult to restructure.163 As such, just as in other market areas,
shifts in investor practice and contract structure may sidestep the
contractual or regulatory fixes designed for the holdout crises of an earlier
era.
An additional weakness or vulnerability in the vulture fund sub-
strategy targeting ostensibly private wealth lies in its internal inconsistency.
Vulture funds, in uncovering and claiming ill-gotten 'private' wealth in
order to maximize collection on their sovereign debt claims, may loudly
bemoan corruption and the havoc that it wreaks. The substance and style
of this strategy, including the accompanying public relations efforts, rest
on a widely professed view that high-level, high-money kleptocracy is
unacceptable. Both the arguments and the atmospherics imply that there is
a clear divide between public and private financial flows, and that the
improper and illicit conversion of the former into the latter should not be
tolerated.
But to the extent that funds meant for a country like Congo-
Brazzaville have been diverted, does that throw into question the validity
of the vulture funds' debt in the first place? Although of course not all
sovereign debt is tainted in this way, some portion of sovereign debt was
originally borrowed under highly questionable circumstances by regimes
with rulers known to be self-dealing, to say the least. Yet creditors in
general tend to deny that corruption or oppression in a borrowing country
should have any bearing on the validity of their debt claims. Instead they
tend to insist on a background rule of complete debt repayment, falling in
line with the historical unwillingness to openly adopt something like an
odious debt approach, noted in Part II.A above. At least for many courts
today, particularly given that the doctrine of odious debt has not been
SOVEREIGN NOTES (2014), https://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-
Practice /Primary-Markets /primary-market- topics /collective- action-clauses /. For a helpful overview
on these model clause changes, see Anna Gelpem, A Sensible Step to Mitigate Soveretgn Bond Dysjunction,
PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON (Aug. 29, 2014), https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-
economic-is sues -watch/ sensible- s tep-mitigate- s overeign-bond-dys function.
163. See, e.g, INT'L MONETARY FUND, MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND PROSPECTS
IN LOW-INCOME DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 52-53 (2018) (noting the greater use of collateralized
loans in certain countries and expressing concern that the extent of such collateralization is unknown
by IMF country teams); Deborah Brautigam & Jyhjong Hwang, Eastern Promises New Data on Chinese
Loans in Ajrca, 2000-2014, Johns Hopkins Sch. of Advanced Int'l Studies, China Africa Research
Initiative Working Paper 4, 2016) (suggesting that up to one third of lending by new creditors in
lower income developing countries may involve collateral).
[Vol. 60:2
2020] SOVEREIGN DEBT, PRIVATE WEALTH & MARKET FAILURE 351
widely accepted, a challenge to the vulture funds' debt claims would be
difficult to argue as a legal matter. Even if an 'unclean hands' defense
might have applied to the original creditors, over time such debt may have
been repackaged as Brady Bonds, perhaps transferred on the secondary
market, and then restructured again under the auspices of an IMF
agreement. One could argue that these transformations have sufficiently
cleansed (shall we say laundered?) the debt of any original taint it may have
borne.16 4 Nonetheless, it seems problematic that creditors can profit from
criticizing and prying open a web of shell companies partially designed to
cover and facilitate the same corruption that they insist remains irrelevant
to their debt claims. Such a tension contravenes the broad spirit of legal
estoppel, even if estoppel's particular doctrinal contours might be hard to
apply. It certainly sullies the air of moral superiority (relative to Bono and
Kofi Annan, for example) that these funds occasionally exude. And,
beyond a failure of argumentative coherence and aesthetics, this tension
also renders the vulture fund's private-asset recovery approach vulnerable
to normative and doctrinal change going forward. If broader norms in
favor of responsible sovereign lending or an odious debt doctrine were
eventually adopted, then the validity of the distressed debt claims
underpinning this asset recovery approach could be undermined, thus
undoing its possible positive externalities as well.
B. Considering Alternatives: Bankruptg, Conditionaliy, and Priate Enforcement
While turning to vulture fund asset recovery as a partial private
corrective to global market failure does have an allure, the foregoing
discussion suggests that there is much to detract from this scheme. Still, it
is worth asking whether the benefits of such an approach might be
captured in other ways. For example, could asset recovery of the sort
conducted by these funds be folded into a sovereign bankruptcy system?
What would be the risks involved of explicitly taking this route? Which
elements could be adopted outside of a statutorily-based restructuring
framework? This section briefly considers several of these possibilities-
not so much as firm recommendations, but rather as a broad invitation to
further thinking along these lines.
164. I leave aside for now the degree to which such arguments could in fact be made in various
courts of law, though I would be sympathetic to the efforts.
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1. Sovereign Bankrupty and Asset Recovey
To begin with, would it be possible to incorporate recovery of
improperly siphoned public assets into the content of reform proposals for
the international financial architecture, including any potential sovereign
bankruptcy regime? Sovereign debt restructuring reform proposals have
tended to focus on the major collective action problem at the center of
resolving debt crises, in particular the difficulty of pressing all of a state's
creditors into a single forum for discussion and agreement.1 65 As a result,
these frameworks have highlighted the importance of imposing a standstill
or stay on creditor litigation, ensuring inter-creditor equity, and providing a
forum for creditors and the sovereign debtor to formulate a plan of
repayment. Perhaps due to this emphasis, one notable element of many
domestic bankruptcy regimes has not made it into sovereign bankruptcy
proposals: namely, the set of provisions allowing for asset maximization
and asset recovery.1 66 But asset recovery provisions could reasonably
receive greater prominence in sovereign debt reform efforts going
forward.
To take the U.S. example, a range of provisions in the Bankruptcy
Code allow the Trustee in Bankruptcy (or the post-petition Debtor in
Possession or 'DIP,' standing in the trustee's place) to recover assets of the
debtor that have been improperly transferred during a period of time prior
to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. These transfers might be undone
under theories of preferential transfer, in which the debtor transferred
assets to or for the benefit of a creditor that allowed the creditor to obtain
more than it would have under a hypothetical liquidation.1 67 Or transfers
165. Perhaps the most famous among these is the proposal by Anne Krueger for an IMF-based
Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM). See, e.g, Anne Krueger, First Deputy Managing
Dir., Int'l Monetary Fund, Speech Before the Bretton Woods Committee Annual Meeting: Sovereign
Debt Restructuring and Dispute Resolution (June 6, 2002). For other proposals, see, e.g., LEE C.
BUCHHEIT ET AL., COMM. ON INT'L ECON. POLICY & REFORM, REVISITING SOVEREIGN
BANKRUPTCY (2013); Christoph G. Paulus, A Resolveng' Procee&ng for Defaulting Soverelgns, in
COLLECTIVE ACTION CLAUSES AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF SOVEREIGN DEBT 181 (Bauer et al.
eds., 2013); Kunibert Raffer, Applyinng Chapter 9 Insolveng' to International Debts: An Economically Efficient
Solution with a Human Face, 18 WORLD DEV. 301, 301-11 (1990).
166. Unsurprisingly, domestic bankruptcy regimes have served as significant models for
proposals for a sovereign debt restructuring system--sovereign bankruptcy proposals are sometimes
referred to as a Chapter 11 for countries (referencing the chapter of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code under
which major corporations generally restructure their debt) or sometimes a Chapter 9 (referring to
municipal bankruptcies). See generally sources cited in note 165, among others. In a similar spirit, the
World Bank Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative has recently published a report on the possibility of
using pre-existing (domestic) insolvency systems in cross-border asset recovery efforts. JEAN-PIERRE
BRUN & MOLLY SILVER, STOLEN ASSET RECOVERY INITIATIVE, GOING FOR BROKE:
INSOLVENCY TOOLS TO SUPPORT CROSS-BORDER ASSET RECOVERY IN CORRUPTION CASES
(2019), https: //star.worldbank.org/ sites /star/ files /going-for-broke.pdf.
167. These preferential transfer provisions are provided for by Section 547 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code. The oil prepayment scheme at the center of the Congo-Brazzaville RICO scheme
discussed above comes to mind as a possible application.
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could be challenged under theories of subjective fraud, in which the debtor
transfers assets with the intent to hide, hinder, or delay recovery-a
provision that might be relevant for corruption concerns. Yet another
avenue is provided by theories of constructive fraudulent transfer, in
which subjective intent is not an issue but the debtor transferred the asset
without receiving reasonably equivalent value in return, so long as the
transfer either occurred while the debtor was insolvent or rendered the
debtor insolvent.168 The specifics of each of these provisions-the time
frame or statute of limitations on transfers, possible exceptions, difficulty
of asset valuation, and likely inapplicability of a liquidation analysis, among
many others-would have to be significantly recalibrated for a sovereign
state context. Still, a narrower asset recovery procedure, to be taken on a
more collective basis and designed to benefit not only creditors but also
the country as a whole, could be proposed and discussed more intensively.
Of course, one significant paradox in incorporating such asset
recovery efforts into a sovereign bankruptcy regime is that their very
existence might make the actual use of any such bankruptcy process less
likely. To the extent that asset recovery powers are lodged with a creditor
committee or creditor representative, or perhaps in an office akin to that
of a bankruptcy trustee or administrator, the officials of a distressed
sovereign debtor country might be more wary of the framework
altogether. Assuming the same background level of corruption that exists
today, such officials might reasonably worry that they themselves, or their
family members and close associates, could become the targets of such
recovery efforts.169 But leaving any such decisions to the sovereign country
itself-acting in a DIP-type fashion in this arena-could run into
significant problems as well. On the one hand, it is possible that the
officials in charge of the restructuring would decline to use these
provisions altogether, choosing instead to use sovereign bankruptcy only
to solve creditor collective action problems. But there might also be the
opposite risk that officials could (mis)use the recovery provisions in a
politicized manner, targeting political opponents in ways similar to the
(alleged) misuse of some domestic anti-corruption campaigns. Including
any such provision in a sovereign bankruptcy framework might thus offer
significant benefits but would also require careful thought, including an
attentiveness to the likely political dimensions on the ground in debtor
countries.
168. For these fraudulent transfer provisions, see Section 548, and the Code also allows for the
incorporation of actions that would be allowable under state law.
169. This dynamic is not necessarily unique to sovereign debtors, of course. Lynn LoPucki, for
example, has characterized the Chapter 11 debtor's bankruptcy attorney as a "Trojan horse"-
brought in to save the day only to turn on those who have opened the gates. Lynn M. LoPucki, The
Debtor's Lawyer as Trojan Horse, reprnted in THE LAW OF DEBTORS & CREDITORS 768-770 (Elizabeth
Warren et al. eds., 7th ed. 2014).
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2. Alternative Private Possibilities
The establishment of a sovereign bankruptcy-type mechanism would, I
believe, offer a significant improvement over current debt restructuring
processes-even if primarily as a background inducement to out-of-court
restructuring. Unfortunately, to date such a far-reaching global reform has
been difficult to press through, and its prospects are not promising in the
near future. As such, variations on the current private-law approaches
deserve consideration as well.
One range of possibilities would involve working within the corners of
sovereign lending documents. For example, the original sovereign loan
contracts could establish that the rights of debt collection and asset
recovery lie exclusively with a bondholder or lending consortium trustee,
and that recovery must be done on behalf of creditors collectively-either
in house or perhaps outsourced to asset recovery specialists in exchange
for a portion of the proceeds. This would be a variation or extension of
the collective action clauses now included in most sovereign bond
contracts, though explicitly applied to decisions about debt collection
rather than changes in substantive lending terms. To support this further,
drafters could include provisions to specify that any independent or ogue
creditor recovery made outside of this process would have to be shared
pro rata with other creditors in the same class (perhaps net of reasonable
recovery expenses). Of course, this addresses the creditor collective action
problem in international finance but perhaps under-incentivizes the type
of aggressive and private-wealth targeted asset recovery that is one of the
possible benefits of vulture funds. As such, drafters could also explicitly
state that any recovered funds that have been improperly claimed as
'private assets' through corruption could be kept by the recovering
creditors, with other more visible and easily discoverable public assets
available only for collective recovery efforts.17 0 One could imagine
numerous variations on these themes, depending on the incentive
structure the contracting parties aimed to construct through the lending
documents.171
Another set of possibilities might involve allowing other entities or
groups to more closely track the strategies of the vulture funds themselves.
For example, would it be possible to establish a non-profit vulture fund to
purchase discounted debt on the secondary market and then take
advantage of creditor status and discovery rules to uncover suspected
170. I would like to thank Ian Ayres for raising the possibility of this partition approach.
171. Of course, it is hard to imagine a corrupt regime willingly signing such loan
documentation. A cleanly administered forward-looking regime might be more likely to agree, and
pressure could also be brought to bear by international lending institutions or private creditor groups,
assuming a broader shift in international norms. Incorporating this into standard/ recommended
contract language at the level of ICMA could also help.
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corruption and recover assets?172 Could other types of civil society groups
attempt to engage in recovery actions analogous to veil-piercing-generally
an equitable remedy pursued by creditors? We seem to work with a
background assumption that citizens of a given country are something akin
to shareholders (if they are characterized as anything at all), who are the
residual claimants in any debt restructuring and thus are properly subjected
to austerity-type measures. But might the citizens of certain regimes be
recharacterized as involuntary creditors, more in line with tort creditors,
given that their subjection to those regimes can hardly be understood as
voluntary? This could launch a line of private law actions with asset
recovery ramifications, brought by citizen groups themselves.
Or perhaps we could imagine something along the lines of a suit
alleging the breach of a duty of loyalty by officials, with an associated
effort to recover funds and the imposition of a constructive trust or
equitable lien. Of course, this assumes that the relevant court recognizes
such a duty to exist in the international context, and that an equitable
remedy is appropriate. Perhaps if something like the UNCTAD Principles
on Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing were more explicitly
adopted, as I encourage below, or if they were understood to be part of
emerging customary international law, such an approach could gain
traction. Of course, this immediately raises questions of jurisdiction and
appropriate forum, among many other issues. It is also unclear who would
have standing to sue government officials for any such breach. The most
obvious representative of the underlying population would be the
government itself-clearly a non-starter. Could we imagine a sub-group of
citizens or a non-governmental organization acting on behalf of the
population as a whole? This raises thorny problems of appropriate
representation-perhaps not intractable, but exceedingly difficult
nonetheless. And if this route were deemed plausible, could such a sub-
group or non-profit be based outside of the country, given the obvious
difficulties of being based in-country while suing the officials of an
oppressive regime? The questions of representation would become
thornier still in such a context. It is no accident that these paragraphs are
heavily punctuated by question marks; the possibilities are intended more
as thought experiments than as concrete proposals. But such avenues
could be worked through more carefully, and they have the virtue of
172. Such a fund would need to purchase a sufficiently significant portion of debt to remain in
play rather than simply be paid off, of course. This raises questions of whether the investment in
support of the public good might not be better spent elsewhere (perhaps more directly in the debtor
country), though presumably at least some portion of recovered funds would go to help the
population of the targeted country itself This also has the problem of depending upon a
fundamentally flawed international system, like the vulture funds themselves.
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avoiding the further entrenchment of a deeply problematic international
financial architecture.
I should emphasize here that these potential mechanisms do not, in
and of themselves, necessitate he distribution of recovered funds in any
specific way. Such funds could be allocated to the recovering creditors, to
an independently administered fund for the benefit of the debtor state
population, to the sovereign state itself (depending on the connection of
the targeted private assets to the administration in power, presumably), or
any number of combinations. Ideally some (or all) of the recovered funds
should benefit the debtor state population, given that the most vulnerable
among the state's citizens will almost certainly struggle under the austerity
measures that accompany a sovereign debt crisis.173 This goal would then
need to be balanced against the desire to incentivize recovery efforts by
those entities capable of undertaking them.
3. Evolvg Rrinciples and IMIF Conditionaliy
If part of the foundation for the current market failure lies in the
intersecting norms and practices of sovereign debt and private wealth, one
obvious step in the right direction would be to improve those norms more
directly.1 7 4 In other words, rather than (or in addition to) addressing
problematic incentives at the back end through debt collection and asset
recovery, we would ideally change the practices up front. There is no need
to reinvent the wheel on this front-indeed, many hours and many reams
of paper have been dedicated to the conceptualization and
operationalization of such improvements. But it is worth reiterating here
how valuable a broad-based endorsement of such principles and
procedures from both private and public sector actors could be.
On the sovereign debt side, the central goal is to ensure that funds
borrowed in a sovereign state's name actually benefit (or least are intended
to benefit) the underlying state population. And, relatedly, any debt that
results from egregiously poor lending decisions would ideally be much
more difficult to collect on, thus limiting the likelihood that creditors-
and loan underwriters-would have any interest in such loans in the first
173. This of course raises questions about the processes by which such funds should be
administered, including who would represent the underlying population if not the (possibly corrupt)
government itself
174. Perhaps it goes without saying, but consistency and the merging of risk and reward are not
themselves the principal goals. While risk and reward may have gone together for Edward III of the
fourteenth century, the political practice that underlined this consistency was of course absolute
monarchy itself (aside from the limitations of the Magna Carta of 1215). The benefits of shifting
away from absolutist government override, certainly in my view, the benefits of consistency in
sovereign debt. As such, another mechanism must be found that comports with a broader
commitment to the public good, which would generally include the collective self-determination of a
country's population.
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place. Of course, it is difficult to define and draw lines around 'poor
lending decisions' and identify 'sovereign benefit.' I have argued elsewhere
that part of the confusion and dysfunction lies in the fact that there is
uncertainty about who even constitutes the 'sovereign' in the sovereign
debt arena, given the multiple theories of sovereign statehood that exist in
international relations, international law, and political theory.17 5 For now, it
is enough to encourage a broader endorsement of the UNCTAD
Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing,
mentioned above, which support the idea that sovereign debt should have
a more substantial connection to the borrowing country's people and
greater respect for that country's underlying constitutional framework and
secondary laws. Aligning lending decisions-and debt enforcement
outcomes-with these ideas could help to shift the tenor and impact of
sovereign borrowing. Similarly, on the private wealth side, more work can
be done on improving the implementation of the UN Convention Against
Corruption and the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and also on
globalizing and broadening state-level laws covering bank transparency
and, perhaps, "unexplained wealth."17
6
One supportive and significant norm shift would be to improve the
transparency of sovereign lending and borrowing. Currently there is no
system in place that provides information that is usable by a borrowing
countries' citizens, by creditors broadly, and by international organizations
and other monitors. Indeed, as the 2016 Mozambique debt crisis
highlights, it is entirely possible for a country to amass direct and
guarantor debt at a large enough scale that it causes a national crisis, all
without the awareness of central government debt managers, the IMF, or
the country's citizens.177 In order to maximize the success of any such
transparency endeavor, a set of principles or guidelines would need to
support the provision of information that is comprehensive, as to both the
175. See LIENAU, supra note 13, at 1-19, 226-40. In this writing I espouse, and continue to
espouse now, what could be called a rule-of-law or constitutionally-based theory of sovereignty, at
least for sovereign debt purposes.
176. For a helpful overview of enforcement challenges in the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,
see, e.g., Rachel Brewster, The Domestic and International Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bnbeuy Convention,
15 CHI. J. INT'L L. 84, 84-109 (2014). For the difficulties and risks involved in using unexplained
wealth laws and other non-conviction-based asset forfeiture in anti-corruption efforts, see Mat
Tromme, Waging War Against Corruption in Developing Countries: How Asset Recoveu Can be Compliant with
the Rule of Law, 29 DUKEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 165, 165-233 (2019).
177. In 2016, Mozambican officials admitted to a range of secret sovereign debts that had no
apparent benefit to the state and had been unknown to the public, the IMF, or other creditors. The
disclosure resulted in a suspension of IMF lending, a debt default, an economic crisis, and a range of
corruption and fraud indictments. See, eg., Paul Wallace, U.S. Probe and Credit Suisse Lawsuit Roil
MoZambique Tuna Bonds, BLOOMERG (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arucles/
2019- 03-06/u- s -probe- and-credit- suisse-lawsuit-roil-mozambique-tuna-bonds; Gabriele Steinhauser
& Matthieu Wirz, Mozambique Fraud Trial Begins as Voters Go to the Polls, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/mozambiquefraud-trial-begins- as-voters-go-to-the-polls-
11571165412.
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type and the terms of the debt, and also accessible to all interested
stakeholders. Ideally this would be through a centrally maintained and
easily searchable global database where both creditors and debtors would
register (and thus make cross-checkable) sovereign loans. The 2019
Institute of International Finance (IIF) Voluntary Principles for Debt
Transparency offer an encouraging statement in the right direction but fall
significantly short of this goal.178 Much more work remains to be done in
order to promote greater monitoring, both externally and more
importantly internally, of how much a country borrows and how those
funds ultimately are used.
Of course, each of these sets of principles and practices, assuming they
were substantively sound, would be more effective if they were
internationally legally mandatory and backed by clear enforcement
measures. But even if this outcome seems unlikely, interested jurisdictions
or parties could still think creatively about incorporating even voluntary
principles at various enforcement points. For example, to the extent that a
jurisdiction like New York State or the United Kingdom hoped to
encourage greater compliance with transparency principles, legal and
political decisionmakers could make sovereign debt contracts
unenforceable in court if the transaction were not timely included in the
applicable registry. At a private law level, such a registration requirement
could also be included in the legal terms of debt instruments themselves
going forward, which would bind not only all parties to the original
agreement but also their assignees. Similar provisions could be fashioned
in support of the UNCTAD Principles or other guidelines.
Even more effective at an enforcement level would be for bilateral
creditors and international financial institutions including the World
Bank and particularly the IMF-to incorporate such principles into their
own lending procedures. Although the IMF purports to avoid politically
tinged decisions (and, unfortunately, thus far has declined to host a
sovereign debt transparency database), it of course has not shied away
from loan conditions that can significantly restructure the economics and
thus the politics of a borrowing country. Laying aside for now the
effectiveness of such measures in the past, the IMF's forays into
supporting good governance certainly provide an opening for it to
178. INST. OF INT'L FIN., VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES FOR DEBT TRANSPARENCY (2019),
https: //www.llf.com/Publicatons /ID /3387/PageID /3387/
Voluntary-Principles-For-Debt-Transparency. For an overview of the shortcomings of these
principles and an outline for a more effective approach, see UNCTAD COMMENT ON THE 11F
DRAFT VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLES FOR DEBT TRANSPARENCY (2019), https://debt-and-
finance.unctad.org/Documents/IIF_Principles-debt-transparency-UNCTAD 10 May-2019.pdf,
on which I served as a consultant. For an additional helpful overview of important elements for
sovereign debt transparency, see Anna Gelpern, About Government Debt ... Who Knows< 13 CAP.
MKTS. L.J. 321 (2018).
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embrace guidelines on debt transparency and responsible lending. This
could work through its ongoing engagement with borrower country
sovereign debt management offices-though of course such direct
targeting might be complicated if part of the problem lies with 'bad actors'
in the countries themselves. Perhaps even more effectively, the IMF could
incorporate such guidelines into its "lending into arrears" (LIA) policies,
by which it decides how, when, and how heavily to lean on borrower
countries to come to terms with private creditors as a condition for IMF
lending. Although the IMF has long been deeply concerned with the
impression that it insures or "bails out" private lenders through its LIA
practices,17 9 its implicit support-or withdrawal of support-for private
sector agreements through the LIA policy could provide one pressure
mechanism: To the extent that a creditor or credit instrument failed to
comport with transparency or responsible lending guidelines, a country's
decision not to come to terms with that creditor would not impact the
IMF's decision on whether or not to lend into arrears (i.e. lend despite the
fact that the country had remaining debts outstanding and un-dealt
with).180
If a vulture fund-based strategy for partially addressing overzealous
and poorly allocated sovereign borrowing is problematic, as I contend
above, unfortunately there are no ideal solutions. A clear, uncomplicated,
timely, and politically palatable fix is the global finance equivalent of a
unicorn. The conceptual path dependence in both the sovereign debt and
private wealth arenas remains strong, as do the interests arrayed in favor of
the status quo. Still, the pathologies of the current system are deep enough
to deserve sustained scholarly and policy attention. Each of the alternative
approaches I suggest here invite further reflection, and they are of course
not mutually exclusive: We should simultaneously improve and better
enforce relevant guidelines and principles, think through possible private
sector innovations, and establish a background international statutory
179. For a relatively early consideration of this concern, see, e.g., Timothy Lane & Steven
Phillips, Moral Hazard. Does IMF Financig Encourage Imprudence by Borrowers and Lenc rs? (Int'l Monetary
Fund, Econ. Issues No. 28, 2002). For additional overviews of the problem and dynamic, see also
NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS? RESPONDING TO FINANCIAL CRISES
IN EMERGING ECONOMIES (2004); Lucio Simpson, The Role of the IMF in Debt Restructurings Lending
into Arrears, Moral Hazard and Sustainabili Concerns, (UNCTAD G-24 Discussion Paper Ser. No. 40,
2006).
180. The precise textual location of any shift in the IMF's LIA policy is frustratingly opaque,
with, for example, relevant policy changes or derogations placed in a footnote to a report or policy
appendix. I thank Yan Liu, Assistant General Counsel to the IMF, for making this explicit in an April
2019 conversation. A helpful overview and example of a textually buried LIA policy that addresses
disputed claims is presented in Matthias Goldmann, A Holistic Approach to Odious Debt:
Preventing Loan Pressing and Corruption in Mozambique and Beyond 19 (May 2019) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author). For an earlier and more general overview and critique of the IMF's
LIA policy, see Lee C. Buchheit & Rosa M. Lastra, Lenadng into Arrears-A Polig Ady , 41 INT'L
LAW. 939 (2007).
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mechanism as well. The scale and scope of the problem calls for every
kind of triangulation.
V. CONCLUSION
In recent memory, certain heads of state have felt secure in the notion
that their personal funds and treasures are cordoned off in a private arena,
separate and safe from the claims of creditors to the sovereign debtor state
that they control. This has held true even if the officials obtained those
luxuries only by siphoning away the wealth of the state itself This
circumstance should, perhaps, be understood as a historically particular
situation-present today but contingent nonetheless. In other historical
contexts, in which the 'sovereign' was both a country and an individual,
unfettered control over sovereign territory included not just personal
benefits but also more explicit personal risk.
In this article, I have argued that the background rules and norms of
contemporary global finance enable this unlinking of the risk and reward
of unchecked sovereign rule in ways that doubly impoverish debtor state
populations. On the sovereign debt side, our collective failure to more
tightly characterize and enforce the appropriate relationship between a
public entity and its individual officials results in easier access to borrowed
funds, which can contribute to an artificially high debt load. On the private
wealth side, our relatively strict protection of the realm of the personal-
and our insufficient willingness to soften certain of its borders-enables
the disappearance of public funds into private accounts and privately
controlled corporations. This combination almost certainly increases
sovereign debt burdens while drawing away funds that could be used for
repayment-a dynamic that likely deepens financial crises and worsens any
austerity measures that result.
If we tend to overlook this intersection between the worlds of
sovereign debt and private wealth, recent vulture fund asset recovery
efforts have helped to shed light on this shaded corner of international
economic relations. These strategies, which I suggest arise in part from
historical shifts in both underlying market structure and narratives around
good governance, expose problematic financial links too often left under-
examined. Although there are public benefits to this greater visibility, I
argue that these vulture fund practices depend on a flawed background
framework, such that ultimately this approach fails as a potential private
corrective. Still, the approach encourages a closer look at alternative
mechanisms that might capture this upside, including possible asset
recovery procedures in sovereign bankruptcy, modified private law tactics,
and improved substance and enforcement for the principles guiding
sovereign debt and private wealth. Some combination of these reforms
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could help to unwind the current system's double impoverishment of
borrower state populations.
Paying closer attention to the dynamics raised in this article also points
to a number of deeper questions within global finance-questions that
encourage both a look backward to how today's norms and practices
developed and a harder look forward to how they should be resolved
conceptually and institutionally. At the heart of the overlap between state
debt and 'personal' wealth are larger questions about how legal forms and
fictions divide the public from the private at the upper echelons of the
international arena: How are the lines drawn between public entities like
countries, municipalities, or state instrumentalities on the one hand, and
private individuals who may hold positions of institutional power on the
other? How do these actors intersect with and work through other non-
natural structures that can obscure the flow of assets and effectively
construct wealth as 'private,' such as corporations, trusts, and foundations?
Does the line-drawing differ across various areas of, and historical
moments in, transnational economic activity and regulation? And how
have the players involved conceived of or used such ambiguity? To the
extent that pathologies arise from these entanglements, what are the
possible conceptual and legal correctives? Can the market in these
intersecting arenas be self-correcting and, if so, when? The relationship
between sovereign debt and private wealth is a perennially uncomfortable
subject-for government officials, financial actors, and international
institutions alike. And, of course, this discomfort is overshadowed by the
real hardship of people in countries squeezed by both significant debt
payments and the siphoning of public funds away from socially beneficial
uses. Disentangling these threads in global finance would help to
rationalize international capital flows in ways that promote the collective
well-being of debtor state populations and improve global welfare writ
large.
